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RICHARD K. SCHWARTZ*
The developing trend' of awarding divorcing parents joint custody of
their children is a phenomenon which cannot be ignored. Changes in
the laws and philosophy of child custody determination upon divorce
are requiring courts, attorneys, and families to yield, albeit reluctantly,
to the joint custody alternative. 2 Some suggestion has been made that
joint child custody will eventually supercede the predominant sole cus-
tody/visitation formula as the standard post-divorce custody program.3
Though rarely recommended for every family,4 joint custody has been
heralded as the ideal vehicle to promote the best interests of the children
of divorce by way of serving the needs of the entire divorce-disrupted
family. Requiring the maintenance, in varying degrees, of the legal and
familial associations which existed before the divorce, joint custody
reflects an emerging view of divorce as merely a temporary crisis in
the life cycle of the family rather than an apocalyptic event.5 After
divorce, the family remains a "family"--with pre-divorce parental equal-
ity with respect to the children-a true family, from the children's
perspective, though in restructured form.
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1. Gardner, Joint Custody is Not for Everyone, 5 FAM. ADv. 7 (1982), reprinted in
JOINT CUSTODY AND SHARED PARENTING 69 (J. Folberg ed. 1984).
2. Although sometimes used synonymously with "joint custody," the terms "divided
custody," "split custody," and "co-parenting," all refer to other variations of custody
arrangements. They and other terms are defined and distinguished in Miller, Joint Custody,
13 FAM. L.Q. 345, 359-61 (1979) and in Folberg & Graham, Joint Custody of Children
Following Divorce, 12 U.C.D. L. REV. 523, 526-28. (1979).
3. Scott, Joint Custody: Does It Work?, MS., Apr. 1983, at 77 (quoting Dr. John
Haynes, President of the Academy of Family Mediators.) One Child, Two Homes, TIME,
Jan. 29, 1979, at 61, (quoting Susan Whicher of A.B.A. Special Commitee on Joint
Custody).
4. See, e.g., M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, THE DISPOSABLE PARENT: THE CASE FOR
JOINT CUSTODY 104 (1978). This book provided most of the fuel for the joint custody
revolution. The authors do list a series of "compelling reasons," the basis of which they
believe a court would be justified in denying joint custody, id. at 174. For a critical
analysis of its authority, see, e.g., Fener, Farber & Kent, Toward the Development of a
Social Policy for Child Custody: A Multidisciplinary Framework, 53 CONN. B.J. 301,
305-06 (1979).
5. Folberg & Graham, supra note 2, at 552. See R. WOODY, GETTING CUSTODY:
WINNING THE LAST BATTLE OF THE MARITAL WAR 45, 46 (1978).
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Joint custody, however, has not met with unanimous approval. Most
critics and advocates choose their sides as the inevitable and pivotal
question is raised: Can divorced parents leave the failed marriage and
the divorce behind to communicate and cooperate for the benefit of
their children?6 The legal and social science literature sets forth lengthy
discussion and strong opinion; unfortunately, it is short on supporting
evidence.7 This Article does not intend to rehash the increasingly re-
dundant arguments for or against joint custody. Regardless of which
side of the issue the reader may stand, joint custody has rapidly gained
a foothold in our system of child custody determination upon divorce.
Moreover, there are as many answers to the above question as there
are sets of parents who emerge from the courts with spousal relationships
severed but with predivorce parental legal relationships intact by the
label of joint custody. Finally, the fact remains that not only is there
no faithful compass for parents, attorneys, or courts to gauge which
spouses will be able to communicate, cooperate, and compromise after
divorce as parents, and which will not, but also there is no one who
can really predict which custody arrangement will be in the best interests
of particular children.
When joint custody has been agreed upon or ordered as the sub-
6. This is not to suggest that this is the only question raised with respect to joint
custody. After all, the fundamental issue always remains whether joint custody is in the
best interests of the children. For representative criticism of the concept in general and
proposed alternatives, see generally Schulman & Pitt, Second Thoughts on Joint Child
Custody: An Analysis of Legislation and Its Implications for Women and Children, 12
GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 538 (1982); Levy & Chambers, The Folly of Joint Custody,
69 ILL. B.J. 412 (1981); Schulman, The Truth About Joint Custody: Some Current
Myths Exposed, 3(1) WOMEN'S ADVOCATE. Probably the most influential resource, J.
GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979).
For general criticism of BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD as a "good
example of misapplication," see, e.g., Folberg & Graham, supra note 2, at 557-59; Foster
& Freed, Joint Custody, A Viable Alternative? 28 TRIAL 26 (May 1979) [hereinafter A
Viable Alternative]; Steinman, Joint Custody: What We Know, What We Have Yet To
Learn, and the Judicial and Legislative Implications, 16 U.C.D. L. REV. 739, 740 (1983);
Felner, Farber & Kent, supra note 4, at 303; Parley, Joint Custody: A Lawyers Perspective,
53 CONN. B.J. 310, 311-12 (1979); Johnston, Shared Custody After Parental Separation,
1982 N.Z. L.J. 8, 9; Clawar, Popular and Professional Misconceptions About Joint
Custody, CONCIL. Crs. REV., Dec. 1983, at 27, 29, 32; M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD,
supra note 4, at 106-13.
7. There are numerous studies, but each contains sample groups too small or deliberate
to be able to derive decisive data on the system. See, e.g., Clawar, supra note 6, at 27;
Steinman, The Experience of Children in a Joint Custody Arrangement: A Report of a
Study, 51(3) AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 403 (July 1981); Steinman, Zemmelman &
Knoblauch, A Study of Parents Who Sought Joint Custody Following Divorce: Who
Reaches Agreement and Sustains Joint Custody and Who Returns to Court, 24 J. AM.
ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 554 (1985); D. LUEPNITZ, CHILD CUSTODY: A STUDY OF
FAMILIES AFTER DIVORCE (1982); Greif, Fathers, Children and Joint Custody, 49 AM.
J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 311 (1979).
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structure for the post-divorce family,' in many circumstances the ap-
pointment of a guardian ad litem for the children to serve as a family
mediator may be the best method available9 to protect the interests of
the children, to promote the objectives of joint custody, and to provide
courts with a mechanism to measure the success or failure of joint
custody. Such a mechanism may resolve many of the problems which
trouble both supporters and opponents of joint custody and may thereby
offer reluctant parents and courts, when circumstances demand an award
of joint custody, the opportunity to experiment with relative safety for
the children.10
I. THE PROBLEM OF JOINT CUSTODY:
COOPERATION OR CONFLICT
The concept of joint custody represents the collaboration of two
fundamental precepts of modern custody law:" (1) the children's best
interests are paramount in the custody determination, 2 and (2) both
parents are presumed to be "fit" custodians of their children.1 3 In the
8. Although the vast majority of the authorities employed for support of the proposition
herein discuss the application of joint custody, mediation, and guardians ad litem in a
pre-decree context, the central concern of my discussion is how these are applied after
the issuance of the final decree embodying a settlement between the parties or an order
for joint custody.
Thus, I will not discuss the methods for attorneys to determine whether joint custody
should be recommended to clients. The use of mediation to effect reconciliation of divorcing
parents or to determine the form of custody optimal for the family also will not be
explored. Nor will the merits of the use of guardians ad litem in the divorce custody
proceedings or others be evaluated. Most of the authorities cited within this paper can
provide such information or direct the interested reader toward the proper sources.
9. The merits of court-connected alternative dispute resolution in the post-decree setting
where certain institutions have already been established to deal with custody problems,
e.g., court-connected conciliation programs, especially where the initial joint custody
agreement was hammered out in such a program, will not be addressed at length in this
article. The greater need in the community at present appears to be to devise a system
to handle post-decree problems where the legislatures or courts have been unable or
unwilling to institute official programs. Note, however, that the proposal made in this
article may have some distinct advantages to such programs. See infra notes 207-09 and
accompanying text.
10. This Article does not advocate the use of the child as a guinea pig for legal
theorists. "[T]he child is not something with which to experiment in determining custody
arrangements after divorce." Speca & Wehrman, Protecting the Rights of Children in
Divorce Cases in Missouri, 38 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 1, 8 (1969). However, under some
circumstances judges may feel compelled by law or circumstance to award joint.custody
despite suspicion as to its success.
11. Salfi & Cassady, Who Owns the Child?. Shared Parenting Before and After
Divorce, 20(1) CONCIL. CTS. REV., Jan. 1982, at 31; Robinson, Joint Custody: An Idea
Whose Time Has Come, 21 J. FAM. L. 641 (1983).
12. Scott & Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 455, 457 (1984).
13. The presumption of equality of parental fitness for custody purposes is embodied
in the law of most jurisdictions. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.03. (Baldwin
1983).
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custody decision making process, primary consideration is to be paid to
the best interests of the children.1 4 Yet, in the adversarial machinery
of the courts, 15 where sole custody is imposed on a two parent family
based "on the issue of parental conflict rather than on the child's
relationship to the individual parents," the result of this inquiry cannot
be less centered on the child.' 6 Children's needs for guidance, care, and
access to each parent rarely cease with the commencement of a divorce
action by their parents, 17 nor with a determination of their parents'
relative fitness by a stranger to the family. s Joint custody provides
children and parents with a custody system which best parallels the
relationship prior to the divorce and, thereby, arguably provides "the
least disruptive custody arrangement" for the children after the divorce.' 9
The joint custody system recognizes not only that children need both
parents after divorce, but also that both parents continue to need strong
association with their children. The psychological health and functioning
14. In every custody decision, in each of the fifty states, courts use this or a similar
formula to guide the reconstuction of the family upon divorce. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3109.04 (Baldwin Supp. 1987). Criticism of the standard has been harsh from
all sides of the child custody law dialectic. See, e.g., Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 12,
at 467; Note, Lawyering for the Child: Principles of Representation in Custody and
Visitation Disputes Arising From Divorce, 87 YALE L.J. 1126, 1135 (1978); Meyer &
Schlissel, Difficult Areas for Judges - Child Custody in Divorces, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 15,
1982, at 1, col. 1; Levy & Chambers, supra note 6, at 417; Chambers, Rethinking the
Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REv. 477, 480-85
(1984).
15. The adversarial nature of custody'decision-making in the courts provides parents
with the ideal stage for the expression of spousal self-interest and encourages competitive
strategies. The essential question of the children's best interests after the divorce is
subsumed by parental interest in obtaining custody of the children as the symbolic prize
of their interspousal war. See, e.g., Green, Joint Custody and the Emerging Two-Parent
Family, CONCIL. CTS. Ruv., June 1983, at 65, 69, 70; Salfi & Cassady, supra note 11,
at 314, Robinson, supra note 11, at 645; I. Ricci, MOM's HOuSE/DAD's HOUSE 51-52
(1980); Gaddis, Joint Custody of Children: A Divorce Decision-Making Alternative, 16(1)
CONCIL. Crs. REv., June 1987, at 17, 19; Folberg & Graham, supra note 2, at 549.
16. Green, supra note 15, at 69.
17. Foster & Freed, Joint Custody, Legislative Reform, TRIAL, June 1980, at 22, 24;
Salfi & Cassady, supra note 11, at 33.
18. Grief, Joint Custody: A Sociological Study, TRIAL, May 1979, at 32, 33.
19. Folberg & Graham, supra note 2, at 536. Note that is not the fact of divorce
which activates dysfunctions in children, but the disruptions associated with it. Scheiner,
Musetto & Cordier, Custody and Visitation Counseling, A Report of an Innovative
Program, 31 FAM. REL. 99, 100 (1982).
For discussion of the manner in which joint custody or shared parenting provides the
children of divorce "continuity and stability," see Clawar, supra note 6, at 31, 32, 36,
37; Salfi & Cassady, supra note 11, at 37; Clingenpeel & Repucci, Joint Custody After
Divorce: Major Issues and Goals for Research, PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL., Jan. 1982, at
102, 107; Kelly, Examining Resistance to Joint Custody, in JOINT CUSTODY AND SHARED
PARENTING 39, 43, 44, 46 (J. Folberg ed. 1984); Miller, supra note 2, at 366; Johnston,
supra note 6, at 16, 21; Note, Joint Custody: The Best Interests of the Child, 18 TULSA
L.J. 159, 166 (1982).
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of the children are "interdependent with and to a large measure a by-
product" of that of their parents. 20 The problems for parents created
by the sole custody scheme and the effect of those problems on the
children are legion.21 With joint custody, parental rights and responsi-
bilities toward the children, proximate to those that existed before the
divorce, continue as if the nuclear family had survived. The court is
not compelled to make an ominous and irrational choice22 between two
relatively fit pre-divorce custodians. Instead, divorce proceedings merely
terminate the marriage, not the family.23 Formal recognition of the joint
custody alternative is a tacit concession by the courts and legislatures
of their comparative ignorance and impotence in making the far-reaching
child rearing decisions better left to the parents.24 Recognition of this
alternative also defers to the constitutional concept of family autonomy. 25
Divorced parents' capacity to cooperate and communicate within the
inherently elastic26 framework of joint custody is unquestionably the key
20. Folberg & Graham, supra note 2, at 553. See also, Controneo, At the Intersection
of Family Systems and Legal Systems: Child Custody Decisions in Context, 53 CONN.
B.J. 349, 354 (1979); Comment, Joint Custody, An Alternative for Divorced Parents, 26
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1084, 1113 (1979).
21. See generally J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: How
CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE (1980) (both authors have been associated
with mediation practice).
For a discussion of the effect of the noncustodial role on fathers, see Hetherington,
Cox & Cox, Divorced Fathers, 25 FAM. COORDINATOR 417, 421, 427 (1976); Controneo,
supra note 20, at 352; Grief, supra note 18, at 32; Trombetta, Joint Custody: Recent
Research and Overloaded Courtrooms Inspire New Solutions to Custody Disputes, 19 J.
FAM. L. 213, 222 (1980); D'Andrea, Joint Custody as Related to Parental Involvement
and Parental Self-Esteem, 21(2) CONCIL. CTS. REV. 81 (Dec. 1983); Robinson, supra
note 11, at 644; Clawar, supra note 6, at 27, 36; Comment, supra note 20, at 1114;
Folberg & Graham, supra note 2, at 563, 564; Foster & Freed, supra note 17, at 23; J.
WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 21, at 237, 242.
For a discussion of the effect of the exclusive custodial role on mothers, see Miller,
supra note 2, at 356; Folberg & Graham, supra note 2, at 553, 583; Trombetta, supra
note 21, at 222; J. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, supra note 4, at 76-79; J. WALLERSTEIN &
J. KELLY, supra note 21, at 102, 109, 110, 117, 120; Clingenpeel & Repucci, supra note
19, at 111.
As for the often harmful effect of divorce on children, nearly every resource cited in
this article examines in varying degree the subject.
22. Kelly, supra note 19, at 46.
23. Robinson, supra note 11, at 644.
24. Spencer & Zammit, Mediation Arbitration: A Proposal for Private Resolution of
Disputes Between Divorced or Separated Parents, 1976 DUKE L.J. 911, 918; Folberg &
Graham, supra note 2, at 560-61.
25. See Folberg & Graham, supra note 2, at 536. For a detailed argument, see
generally Canacakos, Joint Custody as a Fundamental Right, 23 ARiz. L. REV. 785
(1981), reprinted in JOINT CUSTODY AND SHARED PARENTING 223 (J. Folberg ed. 1984).
26. This flexibility permits regular and easy adjustment of the child-care arrangement
to the changing needs of parents and children without resort to the courts. See Gaddis,
supra note 15, at 18; Miller, supra note 2, at 361, 363; Folberg & Graham, supra note
2, at 560-61.
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to the practical viability of the concept. 27 Whether joint custody is "joint
legal custody"28 or "joint physical custody, ' 29 shared decision-making
authority and responsibility, that is, mandatory "parental consultation
and agreement on all major decisions affecting the children," is the
absolute minimum requirement of the model.30 The authorities concur
that the most positive outcomes for children of divorce are promised
when both parents are committed and actively involved in their children's
lives and when parental hostility is supplanted by cooperation for the
sake of the children.31 However, when hostile tension characterizes the
27. Gardner, supra note 1, at 66; A Viable Alternative, supra note 6, at 27, 31;
Miller, supra note 2, at 369.
Parents need not have an amicable relationship, but need only to isolate and shelter
from children their interpersonal conflict. See Folberg & Graham, supra note 2, at 550.
Emphasis must be made that the above authors do not exclusively rest their recommen-,
dations on this factor, but in many cases regard other factors as of equal or relative
importance. The necessity of the element of cooperation and communication, however,
dominates the literature.
28. The greater part, perhaps 95 percent of the joint custody awards only provide for
this shared decision-making power. See Schulman & Pitt, supra note 6, at 543, often
leaving the parties in a custody structure similar to sole custody with liberal visitation.
Zimmerman, The Problems of Shared Custody, 4 COL. LAW 24, 26 (1984). Phear, Beck,
Hauser, Clark & Whitney, An Empirical Study of Custody Agreements: Joint Verses
Sole Legal Custody in JOINT CUSTODY AND SHARED PARENTING 142 (J. Folberg ed.
1984). For criticism of this form of joint custody award, see Why Joint Custody Doesn't
Always Work, CHANGING TIMES, July 1984, at 58, 60; Schulman & Pitt, supra note 6,
at 570; Schulman, supra note 6, at 3.
29. At most, perhaps five percent of the awards are for joint physical custody, where
parents share the day to day care and responsibility for the children. Most joint custody
commentators regard the inclusion of both legal and physical custody responsibilities in
the post-divorce arrangement as essential. See, e.g., A Viable Alternative, supra note 6,
at 28; Steinman, supra note 6, at 740; Clawar, supra note 6, at 27; Skoloff, Joint Custody:
A Jaundiced View, TRIAL, Mar. 1984, at 52.
30. Miller, supra note 2, at 360, 367-68.
31. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 21, at 126, 154, 215, 218. See also M.
ROMAN & W. HADDAD, supra note 4, at 71; Controneo, supra note 20, at 352.
Even the staunchest opponents of joint custody concede that the concept is viable and
salutary for the post-divorce family when both parents agree to it and cooperate in its
execution. See Schulman & Pitt, supra note 6, at 570 ("[S]uch cases are in the minority.").
In BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD, supra note 6, the authors direct their
recommendations for exclusive custody to a psychological parent (with no visitation rights
to the noncustodian) in only "contested custody placements." J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD,
& A. SOLNIT, supra note 6, at 8. They do not object to frequent visitation even in this
context. Id. at 118-20. The argument is that parents who can cooperate after divorce and
who intend to remain active in their children's lives will naturally effect co-parenting
arrangements, and legal recognition of their arrangements is unnecessary. Where judicial
intercession or approbation is required, one or both parents probably lack the necessary
cooperative attitudes to share responsiblity for their children, and the imposition of the
arrangement only promises future conflict within a structure which encourages frequent
parental contact. Levy & Chambers, supra note 6, at 418. See generally J. GOLDSTEIN,
A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 6, at 118-20.
Joint custody is not to be confused with what has been variously termed "co-parenting,"
"shared parenting," or "joint parenting," the essence of which is also parental cooperation.
With co-parenting the sole custody/visitation model is the legal framework for post-divorce
122
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post-divorce relationship, dire consequences for the social and psycho-
logical development of children may be expected.32 If the slightest
divisiveness exists between parents at the time of their divorce, the
compelled interaction of the joint custody formula may exacerbate
parental tensions and destroy all potential for cooperative decision-making
in the future.33 Parents must "allocate ... power and respectability" to
one another,34 by supporting their children's positive relationships with
each parent. Otherwise, the fears of the skeptics of joint custody will
be realized and the children will certainly become the victims, rather
than the beneficiaries, of joint custody.
Joint custody may have definite advantages for children and parents
after divorce, but parental conflict remains the primary issue to be
confronted. 35 Unfortunately, this issue is not likely to become prominent
until the final judgment entry is filed by the court and the parties
return to their respective homes to struggle with the mechanics of their
individual joint custody programs. The issue may have been lost during
the custody proceedings because of statutory presumptions or preferences
for joint custody 36 coercing parents and courts to aquiesce to the scheme37
familial interaction, but shared care and control of the children-not custody-by both
parents is the nature of parental practice. A moral commitment to the children and an
emotional armistice between parents allows determined parents to voluntarily implement
this cooperative venture and eliminates the need for court intrusion in the family. See
Levy & Chambers, supra note 6, at 418; M. MORGENBESSER & N. NEHLS, JOINT
CusToDY: AN ALTERNATIVE FOR DIVORCING FAMILIEs 31 (1981); Salfi & Cassady, supra
note 11, at 35.
32. See J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 21, at 158, 224; Controneo, supra
note 20, at 352; D. SAPOSNEC, MEDIATING CHILD CUSTODY DIsPurEs 12 (1983); Felner,
Farber & Kent, supra note 4, at 304; Clingenpeel & Repucci, supra note 19, at 110;
Steinman, supra note 7, at 409. But cf., Robinson, supra note 11, at 652; Meyer &
Schlissel, Difficult Areas for Judges - Child Custody in Divorce, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 17,
1982, at 1, col. 1, (citing Wallerstein, The Child in the Divorcing Family, JUDGES' J.,
Winter 1980, at 17, 41); Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 15, at 476; Green, supra note 13,
at 71.
33. Schulman, supra note 6, at 4. See also Comment, supra note 20, at 1107;
Clingenpeel & Repucci, supra note 19, at 103; M. MORGENBESSER & N. NEHLS, supra
note 31, at 78. But cf. Green, supra note 15, at 71.
34. Clawar, supra note 6, at 30. See M. MORGENBESSER & N. NEHLS, supra note
31, at 75; Steinman, Zemmelman & Knoblauch, supra note 7, at 561-62.
35. Robinson, supra note 11, at 651.
36. Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 12, examines at length the current legislative adoption
of joint custody.
37. For analysis of effect of presumptions and preferences for joint custody on courts
and parental custody prerogatives during divorce, see generally id.; Salfi & Cassady, supra
note 11, at 248; Davidson & Gerlach, Child Custody Disputes: The Children's Perspective,
in LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 252 (R. Horowitz & Davidson eds. 1984); Moller, Joint
Custody: A Critical Analysis, 14(1) TRIAL LAWYER'S Q. 36, 48, 49 (1982); Schulman &
Pitt, supra note 6, at 554, 560; Zimmerman, supra note 28, at 26; Scott, supra note 3,
at 78.
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or because of judicial reluctance or inability to address the matter.3 8
Also, it may have been submerged into supposedly "voluntary" agree-
ments which have been rubberstamped by courts,39 but which may in
reality be the consequence of coercion or acrimonious bargaining between
the parents and be patently adverse to the best interests of the children. °
On the other hand, the issue simply may not exist at the time of the
divorce.41
The success of joint custody depends upon more than parents trying
to recover from an unsuccessful marriage and a legal and emotional
divorce42 and adopting the cooperative philosophy of joint custody.
Parents must also continually grapple with and resolve their differences
regarding the dynamics of the system as applied to their own and their
children's changing expectations, attitudes, and needs. Parental differ-
ences as to scheduling, child-rearing, and financial arrangements, and
the difficulties which accompany parental relocation and remarriage
38. Joint custody may be the ideal vehicle for courts, aware of their limitations in
predicting the future, to avoid the "agonizing choice" between parents. Miller, supra note
2, at 368, or as "an option preferable to the judicial toss of a coin." Comment, supra
note 20, at 1119. See also M. WHEELER, DIVIDED CHILDREN 73, 86 (1980); Levy &
Chambers, supra note 16, at 418.
39. As with any custody agreement between parents, in most cases, "judicial discretion
is extremely limited and ratification will be forthcoming absent unusual circumstances."
Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 12, at 475 n.95. But cf., M. WHEELER, supra note 38, at
79. Acceptance of agreements by courts without scrutiny may be simply the result of
inherent deficiencies in the system, such as caseload burdens, perfunctory divorce hearings
in uncontested cases, and limited access to the children by the court.
40. Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 16, at 475, 480; Levy & Chambers, supra note 12,
at 412; Second Thoughts on Joint Custody, 2 WOMEN & FAM. L. NEWSLETTER 3, 4
(Feb. 1981) (digest of article by Valerie Pitt). Cf. discussion of the same phenomenon in
criticism of sole custody negotiations, Foster & Freed, Law and the Family: Bargaining
Leverage, Unfair Edge, 192 L.Y. L.J. 6 (1984); Salfi & Cassady, supra note 11, at 33;
M. RoMAN & W. HADDAD, supra note 4, at 167. See also Casasanto, Guardians Ad
Litem: A Proposal to Better Protect the Interests of Children of Divorce, 20 N.H. B.J.
35, 42 (1978); Levin, Guardian Ad Litem in a Family Court, 34 MD. L. REV. 341, 348
n.41 (1974).
In states lacking policy provisions favoring co-parenting, certain parents, especially
fathers, who desire to retain some control of their children's futures may be required to
make unreasonably excessive concessions to reluctant spouses in order to obtain joint
custody, a situation not propitious for future parental cooperation.
41. A particular parent's acquiescence to a court order or agreement for the joint
custody arrangement may reflect that parent's wish to retain emotional ties with his or
her ex-spouse. M. MORGENBESSER & N. NEHLS, supra note 31, at 77; Scheiner, Musetto
& Cordier, supra note 19, at 139; to obtain frequent access to the ex-spouse for purposes
of abuse, see Schulman, supra note 6, at 3; Second Thoughts on Joint Custody, supra
note 40, at 4; to "delude the child that the marriage is not really over," M. WHEELER,
supra note 38, at 73; or a means of "delaying the custody battle that was brewing away,"
Parley, supra note 6, at 314-15.
42. In the continuum of the divorcing process, parents must confront and resolve their
"emotional divorce" after the legal divorce has been left behind. Grana, Post Divorce
Counseling. A Process for Implementing the Role of Separate-But-Joint Parent, 21 J.
FAM. L. 687, 697-98 (1982-1983). See also J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note
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"underscore the flexibility" inherently required in joint custody.43 How-
ever, these differences likewise embody the potential for parents to be
routed from the path of cooperation and communication for the benefit
of the children.
Some mechanism must be found to check and diffuse parental hostility
before it infects the entire joint custody family and before it has an
adverse impact on the children. If such mechanism could also monitor
families' adjustment to the joint custody framework, the prevalent pes-
simism of courts" and the outrage of critics toward joint custody could
be finally validated or dispelled. If such mechanism's ultimate respon-
sibility was also to protect the best interests of the children, the purported
aim of all custody determinations, courts might be less wary of the
joint custody alternative and become released from the "Catch 22" of
"refusing to award joint custody because they have never seen it work,
not knowing its potential for success because they have never awarded
it."' 45 Unless such a mechanism can be found, many children, parents,
and courts will never know if there is a reality to the promised benefits
of joint custody.
II. MEDIATION: MAKING JOINT CUSTODY WORK
A. A Choice for Parents and Courts
At first glance, parents who are at odds with one another regarding
some facet of their joint custodianship appear to have two options: they
can either put aside personal differences and compromise, or they may
drag their dispute into court and risk its escalation into a bitter custody
war. Of course, the initial option is preferable as it comports with the
expectations inherent in the bestowal of joint custody on a family. The
21, at 154; Scheiner, Musetto & Cordier, supra note 19, at 103; Clawar, supra note 6,
at 31-32.
43. Folberg & Graham, supra note 2.
For a discussion of scheduling problems, see Green, supra note 15, at 70; Miller,
supra note 2, at 400; of child-rearing problems, see id.; of financial problems, see id.;
Patterson, The Added Cost of Shared Lives, 5(2) FAM. ADV. 10 (1982), reprinted in
JOINT CUSTODY AND SHARED PARENTING 72 (J. Folberg ed. 1984); Schulman, supra note
6, at 3; Gardner, supra note 1, at 69; of relocation, see Miller, supra note 2, at 397;
Steinman, supra note 7, at 411; Green, supra note 13, at 71; Folberg & Graham, supra
note 2, at 561-62; of remarriage, see Miller, supra note 2, at 393, 394, 397; Grief &
Simring, Remarriage and Joint Custody, CONCIL. CTS. REv., June 1982, at 9.
For anecdotal advice on how parents can deal with these and other events which may
pose a threat to a cooperative custody relationship, see generally I. RIccI supra note 15.
44. Folberg & Graham, supra note 2, at 546.
45. M. WHEELER, supra note 38, at 75. See also Green, supra note 13, at 70.
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latter option, however, may be what happens in fact.4 6 Modification
proceedings, from a judicial policy perspective, would confirm that joint
custody is not a final solution47 to the custody issue and would increase
judicial reluctance to award joint custody. From a practical perspective
centering on the family, where all analyses should begin, modification
proceedings would be devastating, making future shared custody or
parenting for the individual family in most cases impossible. When
cooperation and communication yield to parental hostility, the courts
are fortunately not the only resource parents may utilize to correct the
situation. Parents and courts must be alert to the alternatives available.
Modification proceedings for joint custody families may irreparably
damage the potential for parental cooperation in whichever custody
arrangement follows. 48 When joint custodians opt for additional litigation
over cooperation, a neverending custody struggle may ensue, even more
bitterly contested than the original custody question.49 Many parents
may not have returned to court with the intention to dispute the
fundamental custody issue. Many, if not most, having originally "agreed"
to joint custody, may have no idea of the risks to which they expose
themselves and their children in opening the Pandora's box of custody
litigation. Yet, because a court has already determined joint custody is
in the best interests of the children, in order to challenge this conclusion,
parents may be forced to charge one another with "unfitness or unfair
treatment" in order to prevail.50 With escalation of the conflict, psy-
chological and emotional problems may be expected. For families fi-
nancially troubled from maintenance of joint custody arrangements, the
46. See Ilfield, Ilfield & Alexander, Does Joint Custody Work? A First Look at
Outcome Data of Relitigation, 139(1) AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 62, 64 (Jan. 1981) (results of
a two year study indicated "the proportion of relitigation for joint custody families was
one-half that of exclusive custody families."); Phear, Beck, Hauser, Clark & Whitney,
supra note 28, at 153-55 (using a different population and sampling method from Ilfield,
Ilfield and Alexander, the authors found "no significant difference in the overall frequency
with which [joint custody and sole custody families] returned to court."). Note, however,
that in a more detailed study of some of the cases joint custodians returned more frequently
for modifications than other parents but not as often for contempt proceedings. Id. at
154-55.
47. See, e.g., Skoloff, supra note 29, at 54; Comment, Joint Custody, supra note 20,
at 1109 ("[A]n award of joint custody merely postpones the inevitable decision of which
parent will acquire sole custody."), citing Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act and Remaining Problems: Punitive Decrees, Joint Custody and
Exessive Modifications 65 CALIF. L. REv. 978, 1011 (1977).
48. Note that some jurisdictions permit modification of joint custody plans at any
time upon the agreement of both parents. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.04
(Baldwin Supp. 1987). According to § 3109.04 (B)(2)(6), a court may modify the joint
custody decree "upon the request of one or both of the joint custodians." Id. at § 3109.04
(B)(2)(b). It is doultful this kind of proceeding will threaten the survival of the joint
custody arrangement in the absence of detriment to the child. The situation described
below is where there is an absence of agreement between parents. A discussion of the
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financial burdens of additional litigation may be overwhelming.51 Finally,
and most importantly, these proceedings, purportedly intended to protect
the children's best interests, may have the reverse effect.52 Children
may be left with uncertainty as to their futures and may again face
instability from loss of, or shifting of, environments and parental models.53
Though parental acrimony giving rise to divorce rarely has anything to
do with the children,5 4 when joint custody breaks down, it focuses
primarily on the children.5 When parents cannot cooperate and require
outside assistance to resolve disputes regarding the future of the shared
custody relationship, one can picture few settings worse than the courts
for the airing of grievances, protecting the children's best interests, and,
especially, fostering of future parental cooperation.5 6
various standards employed by courts in modification proceedings can be found in Wexler,
Rethinking the Modification of Child Custody Decrees, 94 YALE L.J. 757, 760-84 (1985).
49. Green, supra note 13, at 68.
50. Axelrod, Everett & Haralambie, Joint Custody, in HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY
CASES 92 (A. Haralambie ed. 1983).
In the initial proceeding, one parent might prevail by showing the other parent's lack
of interest, lack of financial ability, or limited contact with the children.
51. See Note, Non-Judicial Resolution of Custody and Visitation Disputes, 12 U.C.D.
L. REv. 582, 587 (1979).
52. M. WHEELER, supra note 38, at 177.
53. Id. at 177, 198; "When a child is kept suspended, never quite knowing what will
happen next, he may likewise suspend the shaping of his personality...one of the greatest
risks which current procedures pose for children." Id. at 198, quoting Psychiatrist Andrew
Watson.
Note, however, one practical advantage of joint custody is that if such permanent
shifting of environments is necessary, joint custody children, unlike those of sole custody,
will have "developed a comfortable relationship" with both parents, making such disruptions
perhaps less traumatic. See Miller, supra note 2, at 363. Logically, however, severance
of post-divorce intimate ties with the other parent may be twice as stressful.
54. See Kelly, supra note 19, at 43; Green, supra note 15, at 69; Salfi & Cassady,
supra note 11, at 37.
55. See Skoloff, supra note 29, at 54 (children with guilt, "witness and become part
of the litigation process, viewing themselves as the root of the hostilities."); Moller, supra
note 37, at 45 (describing the children's "double burden" of contending not only with
the collapse of their parents' marriage, but with the failure of the divorce "to alleviate
the stresses" the former created).
56. Steinman, Zemmelman & Knoblauch, supra note 7, at 558, draw a direct line
between the amount of court involvement in the joint custody family and the success of
the arrangements, i.e., "the degree to which the court influenced the joint custody
arrangement was negatively related to outcome."
Professor Robert J. Levy asserts that generalizations are inappropriate because "con-
tinuing litigation may be, at least for some couples, a 'healthy adaptation."' He suggests
that some couples "must be so full of interpersonal venom that: (a) they would never
permit a professional to 'mediate' their differences; (b) their relitigation are symbolic
spousal batterings which can take the place of physical assaults; or, (c) their children do
'better' when the parents are litigating because so long as they are fighting each other
in court they do not fight with the children at home." Levy, Comment on the Pearson-
Thoennes Study and on Mediation, 17 FAm. L. Q. 525, 532 (1984).
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The "enforced antagonism" of the adversary system and the "judicial
imposition of a rigid, external structure" 7 upon the family cannot help
but undermine parental cooperation and flexibility. Even in the unlikely
event that joint custody survives a modification proceeding in the courts, 8
the courthouse doors may find themselves revolving with the same
parents again in a matter of time. No precedent has been provided "for
flexibility or cooperative modification ... in the future, should circum-
stances change."59 Parents must learn to cooperate and communicate
after divorce for the sake of the children, but without exploitation of
the children.60 No one suggests, however, that the discipline required
for this effort 6' will not, at times of tension and emotional turmoil, need
buttressing with outside assistance.62 In fact, "whatever custody ar-
rangement a couple adopts, the chances are they will need help in
making it work. '63
Reforms within the adversary system have been suggested to amel-
iorate problems created by judicial resolution of parental conflicts.64
However, it has become apparent that non-judicial and "non-adversary
approaches ... offer a more constructive method of family dispute
resolution. '65 Joint custody commentators are nearly unanimous in the
belief that every joint custody plan should provide for an external non-
57. Comment, supra note 20, at 1123. See Robinson, supra note 11, at 680.
58. W. WISHARD & L. WISHARD, MEN'S RIGHTs 212 (1980); M. WHEELER, supra
note 38, at 83.
59. D. SAPOSNEK, supra note 32, at 98. See also Steinman, Zemmelman & Knoblauch,
supra note 7, at 554 ("Laws that prefer or presume joint custody when parents are in
dispute have created a population of parents who come to joint custody without the initial
motivation and commitment to make it work.").
60. Clawar, supra note 6, at 38; Johnston, supra note 6, at 12; Salfi & Cassady,
supra note 11, at 36; W. WISHARD & L. WISHARD, supra note 58, at 211.
61. Foster & Freed, supra note 17, at 24.
62. Spencer & Zammitt, supra note 24, at 933 ("parents functioning in the emotionally
charged atmosphere of a marital dispute may need assistance in distinguishing the child's
best interests from their own natural possessory interests in the child."). Note that an
absence of "ability of the parties to engage in constructive negotiations," especially in
"emotionally charged disputes" where "the parties have a strong interest in settlement,"
has been regarded as a prime factor urging the use of a mediator. N. ROGERS & R.
SALEM, A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO MEDIATION AND THE LAW 41-58 (1987).
63. Roman & Haddad, supra note 4, at 167. See Clawar, supra note 6, at 38; D.
SAPOSNEK, supra note 32, at 21.
64. Non-Judicial Resolution, supra note 51, at 587 (legal representation of children,
social investigations, mental health professionals as experts).
65. Id. at 583.
66. See, e.g., Note, supra note 19, at 17; W. WISHARD & L. WISHARD, supra note
58, at 212; Clawar, supra note 6, at 33; M. MORGENBESSER & N. NEHLS, supra note
31, at 102; Salfi & Cassady, supra note 11, at 24; Ilfield, Ilfield & Alexander, supra
note 46, at 65; Clingenpeel & Repucci, supra note 19, at 78; Robinson, supra note 11,
at 655; Gaddis, supra note 15, at 20; M. WHEELER, supra note 38, at 82.
In reality, few parents may actually include such provisions in their agreements. See
Phear, Beck, Hauser, Clark & Whitney, supra note 28, at 154 (less than 10%).
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adversarial mechanism for parents to utilize before discord draws them
back into court." Although these non-judicial measures may lack the
protections of individual rights potentially present in litigation, values
consonant with the joint custody system substitute and promise effective
revitalization of parental cooperation and communication with their
application.67 There is an urgent need for alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms: "To compel joint custodians to submit all disputes over
child rearing to a judge verges on the absurd."'6
One alternative system of dispute resolution provides precisely the
precedent required for future cooperation and communication between
joint custodians, for it focuses exclusively upon obtaining that end.69
The system is mediation. Simply defined, "mediation is a process in
which an impartial intervenor assists the parties in conflict to reach a
voluntary settlement of their differences through an agreement that
defines their future behavior."70 Mediation has already developed integral
-ties with the joint custody phenomenon: the practice of divorce and
custody mediation has noticeably contributed to increased parental adop-
tion of the joint custody format,71 and post-divorce mediation, 72 or some
variation of it,73 has been the most frequently recommended solution to
the troubles which disturb joint custody relationships.
67. Note that the opponents of joint custody do not deny the efficacy of these tools
to promote harmony between parents. However, they still maintain that these tools should
be used to "facilitate co-parenting rather than joint custody....The fate of children should
not rest on [the] possibility of success." Levy & Chambers, supra note 6.
68. Miller, supra note 2, at 401. See also Skoloff, supra note 29, at 53; Pogue v.
Pogue, 147 N.J. Super. 61, 63, 370 A.2d 539, 540 (Ch. Div. 1977) ("[W]hen communication
between the parents breaks down, the court cannot be asked to decide questions of routine
discipline.").
69. Coombs, Noncourt-Connected Mediation and Counseling in Child Custody Dis-
putes, 17 FAM. L.Q. 469, 470 (1984). "Although specific techniques of mediation may
vary considerably, the mediator's focus on mutual interest, increased communication, and
a peaceful result is constant." Id. (footnotes omitted).
70. R. SALEM, MEDIATION: THE CONCEPT AND THE PROCESS 50 (1984).
71. Dullea, Turning to Mediation to Settle a Divorce, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1984, at
C12, col. 2. "Most parents who mediate end up agreeing on some form of joint custody."
Id., quoting, Doris Jonas Freed, legal scholar and expert in child custody; Pearson &
Thoennes, Mediating and Litigating Custody Disputes: A Longitudinal Evaluation, 17
FAM. L.Q. 497, 506 (1984). "Nearly 70 percent of those who reached agreements in
mediation opt for joint legal custody....Joint custody characterizes fewer than 30 percent
of non-mediated outcomes." Id. See Why Joint Custody Doesn't Always Work, supra
note 28, at 541 n.1 16. "In Connecticut a study of the disposition of 221 contested custody
cases referred for mediation in the fiscal year 1977-1978 showed that in 10% of the
mediated cases the couples entered into a shared custody arrangement." Letter from A.
Salus, Dir., Sup. Ct. Fain. Div., Connecticut to authors (Feb. 15, 1979).
Note that Steinman, Zemmelman & Knoblauch, supra note 7, indirectly suggest a
correlation between success in mediation and success in joint custody arrangements. Id.
at 558.
72. Foster & Freed, supra note 17, at 24; Clawar, supra note 6, at 33; J. FOLBERG
& A. TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITH-
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Mediation offers joint custodians several distinct advantages to tra-
ditional judicial dispute resolution. Mediation is faster and less expensive
than litigation. 74 Mediation removes the family squabble from the public
arena and offers a neutral third party to facilitate resolution. The
mediator, unlike the court, has no coercive power,75 but returns decision-
making responsibility to the hands of the parents to allow them to
voluntarily agree on solutions to their problems. 76 Cooperative decision-
making, without the prospect of winners or losers, or subtle or overt
evaluations of parental fitness, extinguishes the adversarial flames which
tend to polarize parents. It promotes unique and mutually satisfying
solutions to families' peculiar problems.77 Although a parent may chal-
lenge in court a mediated decision, 78 the greater self-determination and
privacy afforded by the cooperative process may make resort to external
and arbitrary decision-makers less likely.79 Families are not asked to
conform their attitudes and behavior to external expectations, norms,
rules, or structures, but are given the freedom and opportunity to
OUT LITIGATION 162, 184 (1984); Scott, supra note 3, at 78-79. "Joint custody could
take away a lot of leverage from women if there is not 'a process of mediation to balance
the terrible inequity and power distribution found in most relationships."' Id., quoting
psychologist and mediator M. Ruman; D. SAPOSNEK, supra note 32, at 21. See also
supra note 66 and authorities cited therein.
Some authors recommend without reservation that mediation be attempted in every
custody dispute where parents "fail to privately agree." L. KIEFER, How TO WIN CUSTODY
45 (1982) (proviso included for parents not to trust mediation).
73. Some joint custody commentators have recommended a variation on the mediation
formula which combines mediation and arbitration. The parents refer their dispute first
to mediation and then, if mediation is unsuccessful, to arbitration, presumably by the
same individual who mediated the matter. See Gaddis, supra note 15, at 20 (sample
clause); Spencer & Zannit, supra note 24; M. MORGENBESSER & N. NEHLS, supra note
31, at 102. Note that employment of such dual dispute resolution mechanisms is not
unique to joint custody, but is found in other areas of the law and is known as "medarb."
See N. ROGERS & R. SALEM, supra note 62, at 248.
Conciliation, see infra note 123, is also sometimes recommended as a follow-up procedure
to unsuccessful mediation. See Robinson, supra note 11, at 655 n.35.
74. See Dullea, supra note 71, at C12; Axelrod, Everett, & Haralambie, supra note
50, at 42; See D. SAPOSNEK, supra note 32, at 22. ("California's mandatory mediation
process costs only one fourth as much as a trial would for resolving custody and visitation
issues." Id., citing H. McIsaac, Mandatory Conciliation Custody/Visitation Matters:
California's Bold Stroke, 19(2) CONCIL. Crs. REV. 73 (1981)); Pearson & Theonnes,
supra note 71, at 499.
75. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111 (1976); Spencer & Zanimit,
supra note 24, at 932.
76. Spencer & Zammit, supra note 24, at 932; M. MORGENBESSER & N. NEHLS,
supra note 31, at 102; Non-Judicial Resolution, supra note 51, at 593, 597; Salem, supra
note 70, at 51.
77. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIo ST. L.J. 29, 34; Coombs, supra note
69, at 460.
78. M. MORGENBESSER & N. NEHLS, supra note 31, at 102. See DeJong, Goolkasian
& McGillis, The Use of Mediation and Arbitration in Small Claims Disputes (Nat. Inst.
of Justice, U.S. Dept. of Justice 1983).
79. Non-Judicial Resolution, supra note 51, at 593-94, 597.
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construct or disassemble their joint custody relationships according to
their own needs, ambitions, or creative imaginations 0
B. Healing Joint Custody with Mediation
Mediation may be the ideal vehicle for resolution of joint custodial
disputes since it advances a philosophy and strives to attain similar
goals as those found within the joint custody framework. As with joint
custody, which seeks to carry parents beyond their interpersonal hostility
toward a new family harmony and flexibility with focus on the children,
mediation's "central quality" is "its capacity to reorient the parties
toward each other ... by helping them to achieve a new and shared
perception of their relationship, a perception that will redirect their
attitudes and disposition toward one another."81 Both systems, joint
custody and mediation, are disdainful of the suffocating effect of rules
and structures imposed upon the internal workings of a family -by
authoritarian outsiders.82 Both aim to eliminate external interference and
"substitute a more fluid sense of mutual trust and shared responsibility"
to define parental interaction. 3
Child custody mediation, however, does not only seek to "reduce
spousal acrimony and increase cooperative decision-making"; some me-
diators emphasize its maximization of children's access to both parents,84
80. See Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 308.
("Mediation is commonly directed, not toward achieving conformity to norms, but toward
the creation of the relevant norms themselves."); Riskin, supra note 77, at 34. "[M]ediation
is less learned-in by...certain assumptions that dominate the adversary process." Id.
81. Fuller, supra note 80, at 325.
Some joint custody commentators suggest that merely by virtue of the existence of
the arrangement between ex-spouses, even if imposed upon hostile parents, a shifting of
parental attitudes and behavior from conflict toward cooperation or at least "detente"
will occur. See Grief, supra note 18, at 33; Miller, supra note 2, at 364; Folberg &
Graham, supra note 2, at 554; Parley, supra note 6, at 315.
82. Fuller, supra note 80, at 331. "The inappropriateness of formal, act-oriented rules
as a means of organizing the internal affairs of a marriage can be rested on two grounds;
first, that a 'legalistic' conception of the relationship would be destructive of the spirit
of mutual trust and confidence essential for the success of a marriage; second, that the
shifting contingencies of married life-illness, pregnancy, loss of job, the necessity of
housing an indigent relative, etc.-would require reading so many tacit exceptions into
the rules that they would, in any event, forfeit their efficacy as an organizing principle
of the relationship." Id.
83. Id. at 326. See D. SAPOSNEK, supra note 32, at 21. ("Mediation is the ideal
format for [joint custody] negotiations, since it rests on the principle of cooperative
sharing.").
Joint custody may be described as "an ideal, a policy, and a set of expec.tations,"
Steinman, supra note 6, at 740, to create a "philosophy of trust and cooperation wherein
the nonexclusive rights of the parties can be negotiated to fit the precise circumstances
of a particular case." Gaddis, supra note 15, at 18. See also Foster & Freed, supra note
17, at 24.
84. D. SAPOSNEK, supra note 32, at 107. "The mediator tries to implement a plan
that allows the child a regular and continuous relationship with both parents. Generally,
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thus in full accord with the nature of joint custody. That mediation
regards children's continued contact with both parents as an essential
goal of its process is really not surprising, for both joint child custody
and mediation are merely reactions in kind to the deplorable effects of
parental combat on children85 and to the general trauma undergone by
children when parents go through a divorce.8 6 The strildng parallels
which may be drawn between joint custody and mediation urge an
attempt to combine the two devices in the post-divorce setting for
resolution of joint custodial disputes.8 7 Together, they can greatly
strengthen the prospect for successful joint custodial parenting.
Mediation provides parents with an opportunity to retain a sense of
autonomy and self-determination imparted by joint custody for the
governance or post-divorce family affairs.8 Because parents remain the
ultimate authorities on the direction and nature of their family's future,
much as if there had never been a divorce, 9 they are less prone to
feelings of bitterness and helplessness as might be created by "the
capriciousness of ... the judicial dice throw," 90 or by the intrusion of
stifling judicial biases, principles, or precedents upon their unique family
problems.91 One function of the mediator is to emphasize, "that, if the
matter is settled 'within the family,' the decision will reflect their common
values." 92 There is no doubt that "parents and children must live with
the mediator must assume that...both parents are adequate to be caregivers to their child
and both have important individual contributions to make to the rearing of their child."
Id. at 259. See also J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 179.
85. Grana, supra note 42, at 687-88; Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 71, at 499
("[I]mprove the dismal child support payment performance... and encourage visitation.").
86. Coombs, supra note 69, at 469. See D. SAPOSNEK, supra note 32, at 2 ("Child
custody mediation is an alternative approach for resolving custody disputes in a way that
is most congruent with our current knowledge of the needs and development of children
of divorce.").
87. In Fuller, supra note 80, Professor Lon Fuller sets out in his influential article,
Mediation-Its Forms and Functions "several 'characteristics of the labor-management
relationships which make mediation a particularly appropriate mechanism in that context."
Id. It has been noted that "three of these traits are also found in post-marital problems:
(1) a dyadic relationship in which (2) the parties must reach an agreement in order to
preserve their control over their common actions and in which (3) the agreement reached
by the parties will help to define their future interactions." Spencer & Zammit, supra
note 24, at 932, n.87.
88. Dullea, supra note 71, at 12.
89. See Riskin, supra note 77, at 34; Axelrod, Everett & Haralambie, supra note 50.
"It makes the family, rather than the legal system, become the place of first resort,
providing parental control over issues which will influence the family members' lives."
Id.
90. Comment, supra note 20, at 1110 n.176.
91. Non-Judicial Resolution, supra note 51, at 586, 594; Riskin, supra note 78, at
34; M. WHEELER, supra note 38, at 206. See also Comment, supra note 20, at 1086.
92. Spencer & Zammit, supra note 24, at 932.
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the ... decision made, and are much more likely to successfully im-
plement -an arrangement arrived at through their own decision-making
process than one imposed on them by the court. '93
Private decision-making is fundamental not only for joint custody
arrangements94 but for all domestic disputes: "Including privacy helps
quell feelings of embarassment and inadequacy on the part of parents
and reduces the negative impact of familial disputes upon children." 95
The mediator must always remain impartial between the parents, 96 since
his or her "effectiveness will depend upon [the] ability to establish a
relationship of trust and confidence" with the parents.97 Removed from
an adversarial forum and without public record, the mediation begins
with assurances by the mediator of the confidentiality of the sessions,
unless disclosure is required by law or unless prior consent to disclosure
is obtained from the participants.9" Some parents may agree in writing
to waive all rights to call the mediator as a witness in any subsequent
related proceeding. 99 Ideally, the only public indicia, if any, of a dispute
between parents and its ultimate resolution in mediation will be a written
agreement found by a court to be in the best interests of the children
and incorporated into the original decree. 100
93. Robinson, supra note 11, at 682. See Sander, supra note 75, at 120 ("[S]uch
solution is likely to be far more acceptable...and hence durable.").
94. Gaddis, supra note 15, at 932.
95. Spencer & Zammit, supra note 24, at 919.
96. See ABA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYER MEDIATORS IN FAMILY Dis-
PurEs, BNA FAM. L. REP. & TAX GUIDE (8/3/84) [hereinafter STANDARDS FOR LAWYER
MEDIATORS].
97. Spencer & Zammit, supra note 24, at 933 n.88. See R. Salem, supra note 70,
at 55-56; Axelrod, Everett & Haralambie, supra note 50, at 42 C'[A]II mediation con-
templates the use of an impartial and trusted third party....").
98. STANDARDS FOR LAWYER MEDIATORS, supra note 96, at Standard II, "spec.
consid." A.
The private mediator, as of yet, has no privilege recognized to quash a subpoena issued
to obtain his or her testimony. Moreover, the mediator may have a statutory obligation
to come forward and disclose child abuse or felonies. In certain instances, additionally,
a duty to warn may arise under tort law by virtue of the confidential or fiduciary
relationship created during mediation. The mediator may wish to describe these obligations
to the parents before mediation begins. See J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 72,
at 183-84.
99. See Non-Judicial Resolution, supra note 51, at 595; Coombs, supra note 69, at
476, 491.
The same public policy which voids parental contracts for binding arbitration of child
custody disputes may override parental agreement here. Courts do not wish to see the
children's best interests bargained away by contract. Axelrod, Everett & Haralambie,
supra note 50; Spencer & Zammit, supra note 129, at 925, 929. But cf. Comment, supra
note 20, at 1122 (recent cases upholding arbitrated decisions); Robinson, supra note 11,
at 655 n.35 (citing O.J. Coogler, suggesting courts will uphold such decisions).
100. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(B)(2)(b) (Baldwin Supp. 1987). See also
supra note 48 and discussion contained therein.
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A "continuing relationship" between parties in conflict is regarded
as another significant factor urging mediation as an appropriate means
of dispute resolution.' 0' Adjudicatory processes which encourage adver-
sarial, public posturing which creates divisiveness between parents can
only undermine the prospects for future cooperation in long-term rela-
tionships. 102 Joint custodians, regardless of the outcome of their particular
dispute, must continue to interact as parents, if not as joint decision-
makers, and mediation provides the "opportunity to nurture" this post-
divorce relationship, 03 that is, "to alleviate the long-run tensions as well
as resolve the immediate controversy."'1 4 Since it is minimally disruptive
to the long term interdependent relationships in the family, mediation
offers a clear advantage over other dispute resolution processes.
Mediation may also have a greater ability relative to other forms of
dispute resolution to uncover and resolve underlying controversies which
divide joint custodians. Unlike adjudication, with its narrow, rule-oriented
approach which "treats every surface symptom as an isolated event,"
mediation examines underlying needs and interests of the family even
though these might not be significant in the courts. 05 For example,
emotional trauma over the divorce or other unfinished business from
the marriage, as well as resentment over social or financial advantages
of an ex-spouse, may be the actual cause of parental conflict. Although
commentators differ as to the proper methods of dealing with these
issues, supposedly ancillary to the dispute over the children, 0 6 there is
little doubt that, in general, mediation utilizes the greatest variety of
tools to resolve underlying tensions while addressing the "surface" issues
at hand. 107
101. N. ROGERS & R. SALEM, supra note 62, at 49-50.
102. See id. See also Folberg & Graham, supra note 2, at 549; Salfi & Cassady,
supra note 11, at 33-34.
103. Coombs, supra note 69, at 469; M. WHEELER, supra note 38, at 207.
104. Sander, supra note 75, at 121.
105. Id., at 120. See also Riskin, supra note 77, at 34 ("[W]hatever a party deems
relevant is relevant."); N. ROGERS & R. SALEM, supra note 62, at 27, 44.
106. Although most commentators discuss this problem in the context of divorce
mediation, their divergent approaches may be equally applicable in post-divorce mediation.
Some writers contend that any line drawn between custody issues and other ones is
"artificial" and that all "interrelated aspects of... conflict should be resolved together."
J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 72, at- 168. Others suggest leaving financial and
other such issues to attorneys, Hopkins, Evaluative Mediation, Upholding the Child's
Best Interests, 20 CONCIL. CrS. REv. 63, 67-68 (Dec. 1982), or severing them totally
from discussion of the children. Coombs, supra note 69, at 471, 475. Specifically addressing
the problem of dealing with parents' emotionality in mediation, one mediator comments:
"Resolutions to the emotional problems presented in mediation may be forthcoming after
an agreement is reached, but not before. It is only when couples begin to behave in
trustworthy and trusting ways that they can begin to develop insight about themselves
and each other." D. SAPOSNEK, supra note 32, at 178.
107. Fuller, supra note 80, at 309.
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C. The Role of the Mediator
The mediator, employing a wide variety of techniques and strategies, 0 8
guides parents toward development of solutions for their own unique
problems. The techniques employed may vary according to the particular
mediator, participants, or dispute involved, and may range from simply
setting basic ground rules for the mediation process'0 9 or caucusing"0
to complex strategies, such as role playing."' Certain elementary in-
gredients of mediation, however, can be distilled for successful mediation
in general, especially in the joint custody context.
An essential role the mediator assumes in the course of dispute
resolution is that of fact finder/educator, a multi-leveled function. As
fact finder, the mediator must gather "sufficiant information from the
participants so they can mutually define the issues to be resolved in
mediation."' 2 Skillful fact finding may reduce "inequalities of power
brought about by lack of information regarding family finances, the
legal process, typical postdivorce reactions, or the developmental needs
of the children.""' 3 If the mediator as fact-finder is mutually respected
by the parents, an "independent appraisal of their respective positions
will often be difficult to reject" and thereby "may be a potent tool for
inducing settlement."'" 4 This appraisal or educative analysis may simply
delineate the participants' separate and mutual needs and interests,"15
or may even extend to recommendations for outside expert consultations
"in the event that it appears that additional knowledge or understanding
is necessary for balanced negotiations."" 6 It has been suggested that
the mediator should be equipped to educate parents on "basic principles
of child psychology and family dynamics,""17 although therapy or coun-
seling is clearly a distinct process from mediation, and this function
may be performed by outside experts." 8 Educating parents about the
108. This paper will not explore in depth the various techniques and strategies mediators
may use to create consensus during mediation. For analysis and advice, see generally D.
SAPOSNEK, supra note 32; F. BENENFIELD, CHILD CUSTODY MEDIATION (1984).
109. See, e.g., D. SAPOSNEK, supra note 32, at 70; Scheiner, Musetto & Cordier,
supra note 19, at 103; Coombs, supra note 69, at 475.
110. See Riskin, supra note 77, at 35; Coombs, supra note 69, at 474-75.
111. See Coombs, supra note 69, at 475.
112. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY MEDIATORS, 17 FAM. L.Q. 455, 456
[hereinafter STANDARDS FOR FAMILY MEDIATORS]. See also id. at 458.
113. J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 185. See also Sander, supra note
75, at 117.
114. Sander, supra note 75, at 116.
115. See Riskin, supra note 77, at 34.
116. STANDARDS FOR FAMILY MEDIATORS, supra note 112, at 458.
117. Non-Judicial Resolution, supra note 51, at 593. See also D. SAPOSNEK, supra
note 32, at 37 ("Child custody mediators who are not specifically trained in these areas
may seriously compromise the benefits of child custody mediation.").
118. See, e.g., STANDARDS FOR FAMILY MEDIATORS, supra note 112, at 455; J.
FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 158.
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"harm inflicted on the children during the divorce process" may reinforce
or create an "openness" and "willingness to change" in parents which
then may be employed to "help parents diffuse their anger and resolve
underlying emotional issues.""19 The mediator is obligated, additionally,
to define mediation in the larger context of all procedural alternatives
available to parents. 20 Thus, the mediator can help the family to
"realistically assess the financial and emotional costs" of opting for
litigation over cooperation.' 2 '
Education becomes subtle persuasion, 2 2 and mediation therefore may
become a form of conciliation. 2 3 Although a mediator may be reluctant
to offer legal advice, 2 4 he or she may, in order to effect compromise,
remind recalcitrant joint custodians that litigation of their dispute may
bring application in the courts of various statutory or judicial policies-
such as friendly parent provisions,12' legal preferences for joint custody,
119. Non-Judicial Resolution, supra note 51, at 594.
120. This may be required at the beginning or end of each mediation process, or
both. See STANDARDS FOR FAMILY MEDIATORS, supra note 112, at 455, 459.
121. Non-Judicial Resolution, supra note 51, at 593.
122. See D. SAPOSNEK, supra note 32, at 190. "For example, a mediator may be
able to facilitate an agreement by supplying vivid stories of other couples' traumatic
experiences of court custody battles, of their near financial ruin from lawyers' fees and
court-related expenses, of the damaging psychological effects to children of testifying in
court, and of the endless cycle of court battles, which typically repeat year after year."
Id.
123. "Conciliation" may actually be the more appropriate term for the process referred
to in this article as mediation, although "in common usage, the distinctions between the
two have become blurred." N. ROGERS & R. SALEM, supra note 62, at 248. "In conciliation,
the conciliator is a neutral third person who offers options for the parties to consider,
points out the advantages and disadvantages of each, and encourages the parties to adopt
one of the available options...." Robinson, supra note 11, at 656 n.35. Therefore, the
conciliator takes a more active or directive role in dispute resolution than the mediator.
See Hopkins, supra note 106, at 63. In the family law context the distinction between
conciliation and mediation has been described in the following manner:
Conciliation begins with the goal of reconciling the spouses if at all possible...minimizing
the conflicts in the divorce and assisting the parents in cooperating with each other
for the interests of the children. Thus, conciliation is a therapeutic intervention in
the family. Mediation, on the other hand, assists the parents in coming to specific
agreements with respect to the issues of litigation and in drafting those agreements
in written form for presentation to the court. Thus, mediation is a therapeutically
oriented legal intervention in the family.
Axelrod, Everett & Haralambie, supra note 50, at 47 (footnotes omitted).
Although reconciliation of the marriage is certainly not Within the contemplation of
joint custody mediation, the other objectives of conciliation are.
124. See STANDARDS FOR FAMILY MEDIATORS, supra note 112, at 458; Coombs, supra
note 69, at 475.
125. A "Friendly Parent" provision, a term coined by Schulman & Pitt, supra note
6, at 554, is a statutory directive to courts that in the event joint custody is denied, sole
custody is to be awarded to the parent most likely to encourage frequent contact between
the non-custodian and the children. The philosophy, if not the effect, see Scott & Derdeyn,
supra note 12, at 479; Axelrod, Everett & Haralambie, supra note 50, at 54-55; Scott,
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judicial biases favoring mothers or remarried fathers,126 or merely judicial
impatience with modification proceedings. Some mediators, "may even
apply economic, social, or moral pressure to achieve 'voluntary' agree-
ment." 27 Even if the mediator assumes the more common, passive role
of a go-between, merely "keeping open lines of communication," 28 the
mediator may still be required to "point out overreaching, unfairness,
or inappropriate proposals," 29 and to "keep the issue open and the
discussion focused until another solution can be found that considers
more variables." 30 This function of the mediator-to expand the re-
sources available to parents, or "to convert zero-sum games into non-
zero-sum games"- 31-may include the strategical offering of options by
supra note 3, at 78, of such a provision has been approved by sole custody and joint
custody advocates alike. See, e.g., J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 6,
at 118 ("[T]o accord with the continuity guideline"); Controneo, supra note 20, at 351;
Robinson, supra note 11, at 683; Salfi & Cassady, supra note 11, at 36; Trombetta, supra
note 21, at 223. "By contrast, under today's custom of choosing between parents, control
tends to go to the parent who is most adamant about excluding the other, mounts the
strongest courtroom battle and is least open to the idea of co-parenting." Id.
126. As for judicial preferences for maternal custody, see M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD,
supra note 4, at 163-66; Grief, supra note 18, at 32; Scott & Derdyn, supra note 10, at
468; Moller, supra note 37, at 43. The figures for the dismal success of fathers in the
contested custody cases are rarely disputed. See Miller, supra note 2, at 354 (10%);
Phear, Beck, Hauser, Clark & Whitney, supra note 28, at 155 ("Maternal requests for
sole custody were realized twice as often as paternal requests"); Comment, supra note
20, at 1119, n. 177 (quoting Statistics from the American Society of Divorced Men, 4
FAM. L. REP. 2456 (1978)) ("[I]f both parents are equally fit...the man will win 20% of
the cases. If...the mother is unfit, the father has an even chance at prevailing.") Nonetheless,
there are those who argue the fathers' chances of winning custody are better than the
mothers' and that "close to two-thirds...of the fathers who requested custody were awarded
it." Schulman, supra note 6, at 4. Here, by examining authorities, the division between
men's and women's rights groups on the issue of the need for joint custody is apparent.
It should be noted that joint custody may eliminate one problem which sole custody
mothers confront when their spouses remarry. Courts will on occasion prefer the two-
parent home with a father figure over the working single mother with a boyfriend sole
custody arrangement and thereby shift sole custody to the father upon his remarriage.
Hendrickson & Schulman, Trends in Child Custody Law: What They Mean for Women,
20, 24-26 (Sept. 10, 1981) (available from National Center on Women and Family Law).
Joint custody may reduce the likelihood of this occurrence, as the original "family," with
both the father and the mother remaining prominent in the children's lives, is retained
after the divorce and remarriage. Moreover, joint custody may reduce the chance that
either parent's spouse can successfully adopt the children over the veto of the other parent.
Miller, supra note 2, at 394.
127. Riskin, supra note 77, at 36 (footnotes omitted).
128. Id. at 35.
129. Axelrod, Everett & Haralambie, supra note 50, at 42. See J. FOLBERG & A.
TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 150-51. See also STANDARDS FOR FAMILY MEDIATORS, supra
note 113, at 457 (mediator should be impartial but not neutral).
130. J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 150.
131. Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of
Problem Solving, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 754, 809 (1984). See also id. at 801-13.
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the mediator. 32 If proposals are made for the parents to consider,
however, it must be emphasized, they are, "to be given no independant
weight or credence," for parents retain the ultimate responsibility for
decision-making.13
Generally the mediator's tactics are directed toward inducing parents
to a "shift in consciousness about the nature of conflict resolution"
away from "adversarial thinking"--toward a change in parental "atti-
tudes, beliefs, feelings, and behavior." 34 Whereas the adversary system
inhibits cooperation and communication between parents, the mediator
encourages the parents to develop "new patterns of relating to each
other which are appropriate for their continuing roles as co-parents."
35
Perhaps all the parents require, after having emerged from adversarial
combat is "both permission and opportunity to communicate, and to
learn new things about each other" for them to begin to unilaterally
solve their problems. 36 The mediator's presence, alone, listening to
them,137 may put them on their good behavior for this process. 13 However,
parents during mediation may require more direction, and an adjustment
of focus from past events towards present interests, particularly those
of the children. 39 The mediator by "management of the interchange"
demonstrates to the family "that it is possible to discuss divisive issues
without rancor or evasion," 40 and by developing a bond of trust between
him or herself and the parents, gradually recreates trust between the
parents themselves.' 41 Although there are those who contend, echoing
the critics of joint custody, that the process is only suitable for parents
predisposed to cooperation, 42 others disagree and argue that mediation
may be most beneficial to those "in strong dispute." 43 Thus, a mediator
132. R. SALEM, supra note 70, at 56-57; STANDARDS FOR LAWYER MEDIATORS, supra
note 96, at Standard I, spec. consid. c.
133. STANDARDS FOR LAWYER MEDIATORS, supra note 96, at Standard I, spec. consid.
C.
134. D. SAPOSNEK, supra note 32, at 22. See Steinman, Zemmelman & Knoblauch,
supra note 7, at 558.
135. Non-Judicial Resolution, supra note 51, at 594 (footnotes omitted). See D.
SAPOSNEK, supra note 32, at 21 ("[M]ediation...rests on the principle of cooperative
sharing.").
136. Scheiner, Musetto & Cordier, supra note 19, at 103.
137. See R. SALEM, supra note 70, at 52-55, 59.
138. Fuller, supra note 80, at 309.
139. See id.; D. SAPOSNEK, supra note 32, at 70.
140. Fuller, supra note 80, at 309.
141. R. SALEM, supra note 70, at 58-59. "The mediator's job is to transfer the trust
to the parties and hope you leave them with trust in each other." Id., quoting Thomas
R. Colosi, Vice Pres. of Am. Arb. Assoc.
142. Riskin, supra note 77, at 33; Dullea, supra note 72, at 15 ("Most professionals
say the process will not work for hostile couples."). For inferential clinical support of this
proposition, see generally Steinman, Zemmelman & Knoblauch, supra note 7.
143. DulIlea, supra note 71, at C12. "Those who have worked out the emotional issues
don't get out of hand in an adversarial setting." Id., quoting J. Haynes, family mediator
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may employ his or her talents to develop cooperative consciousness
between even joint custodians who have had, by court order or some
manner of coercion, the structure imposed on them.
144
Striving to achieve cooperation between antagonistic parents is only
one aspect of the mediator's dual purpose in family mediation. The
mediator must also be an "advocate for the children."' 45 Although not
always expressed in terms of "advocacy," mediation literature repeatedly
emphasizes that the mediator's function is to promote the children's
best interests. 46 Usually, this means "that children be left with two
functioning parents and a method of intimate communication with
them."' 147 Custody mediation is distinguished from "most other kinds of
mediation, because divorce is not just a two party dispute ...; there
exists an interested and often powerless third-party, the child, whose
interests must be presented and upheld." 48 The mediator may remain
impartial as between the parents, but cannot remain neutral as to the
path mediation follows:' 49
The mediator ... has a duty to assist parents to examine the separate
and individual needs of their children and to consider those needs apart
from their own desires for any particular formula. If the mediator believes
that any proposed agreement between the parents does not protect the
best interest of the children, the mediator has a duty to inform them of
this belief and its basis.
50
One of the central purposes of mediation of parental conflict should be
"to minimize the adverse impact which the situation will have on the
children."'' Concentrating parental attention on the children's best
and author. See Pearson & Theonnes, supra note 71, at 516 ("We find that many couples
who have extremely strained relationships, complex disputes, and severe financial pressures
are able to produce agreements in mediation.").
144. See D. SAPOSNEK, supra note 32, at 21 ("Whether joint custody is imposed or
mutually agreed upon... [m]ediation is the ideal format for...negotiations.").
145. See D. SAPOSNEK, supra note 32, at 37.
146. See Spencer & Zammit, supra note 24, at 911; Scheiner, Musetto & Cordier,
supra note 19, at 103; STANDARDS FOR FAMILY MEDIATORS, supra note 112, at 457;
STANDARDS FOR LAWYER MEDIATORS, supra note 96, at Standard III, spec. consid. D;
Coombs, supra note 69, at 482; Hopkins, supra note 106, at 63.
147. J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 179 (summarizing the message of
literature "about children of divorce and custody mediation.").
148. Hopkins, supra note 106, at 63 (emphasis omitted).
149. See id.; STANDARDS FOR FAMILY MEDIATORS, supra note 112, at 457 ("Impar-
tiality is not the same as neutrality"); D. SAPOSNEK, supra note 32, at 178-79; R. SALEM,
supra note 70, at 61-62.
150. STANDARDS FOR FAMILY MEDIATORS, supra note 112, at 457. See STANDARDS
FOR LAWYER MEDIATORS, supra note 96, at Standard III, spec. consid. D.
151. Spencer & Zammit, supra note 24, at 911.
Consider: Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 12, at 493. "There are indications that even
when parents are committed to and happy with joint custody, some children may have
difficulties with the arrangement. This may result either from confusion and anxiety
associated with living in two homes, or because of loyalty conflicts and a concern with
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interests during mediation, however, "does not represent an attempt to
impose an external paternalistic force; rather, it reflects the assumption
that parents will want to reach a decision which will promote the child's
welfare." 152
Although development of parental cooperation during mediation may
lead to better adjustment in children," 3 often the mediator must play
a more persuasive role as an advocate, continually pressing upon parents
their responsibilities to the children'5 4 and reiterating their children's
rights "to a good relationship with both parents ... support [from] both
parents."' 55 Some mediators suggest that the children become actual
parties to the mediation, 5 6 although the question of the extent of
involvement of children in the process remains generally unsettled in
the mediation community. 57 The mediator's expression and actions
throughout mediation which indicate concern for the children's welfare
and for their involvement in the process, "usually engenders a reciprocal
response in the parents, who appear to become more flexible and
reasonable both in terms of their personal interaction and in their
fairness toward both parents." Id. Zimmerman, supra note 28, at 26 (quoting Judith S.
Wallerstein, author and psychologist), ("We're asking children to be more flexible than
many adults could be.").
152. Spencer & Zammit, supra note 24, at 932-33.
153. Axelrod, Everett & Haralambie, supra note 50, at 43. "To the extent that
mediation leads to a greater parental adjustment, reduces levels of parental conflict, and
increases time that parents can devote to their children, children become better adjusted."
Id., quoting Pearson, Child Custody: Why not Let the Parents Decide, 20 JUDGES J. 6
(1981). See also J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 180; Steinman, supra note
7, at 413; Clawar, supra note 6, at 28 ("[Tjhe child who manifested regressive behavior
during the custodial conflict improved radically when he learned that his parents were
involved in custody counseling.").
154. Coombs, supra note 69, at 481-82.
155. Davidson & Gerlach, supra note 37, at 261 (footnotes omitted).
156. Coombs, supra note 69, at 480.
Involvement of the children may be necessary in some situations as the children may
be " innocent but functional contributor/s] to conflict between the parents," D. SAPOSNEK,
supra note 32, at 120, by their reunification strategies, manifestations of separation anxiety,
testing of parental love, attempts at fairness between the parents, and attempts to protect
their own and parental self-esteem. Id. at 123-32. See also Steinman, supra note 7, at
409.
157. See J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 179.
One author suggests "that the mediator who contemplates involving the children in
an ongoing...process clarify several issues for himself prior to involving the children."
These include: (1) the likelihood of success; (2) parental willingness to include the children
or the potential for further polarization by their presence; (3) parental ability to control
their behavior in front of the children; (4) parental deference to children's desires; and
(5) where the mediation will take place. Phear, Involving Children Within the Divorce
Mediation Process, in ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF FAMILY DISPUTE RESOLUTION 205, 207
(H. Davidson, L. Ray & R. Horowitz, eds. 1982).
Advantages and methods of bringing children into the mediation process are discussed
in Coombs, supra note 69, at 479-81; D. SAPOSNEK, supra note 32, at 83-90, 189; J.
FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 180-83.
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decisionmaking."'15 Therefore, as with joint custody where mutual access
to and control of the children may mollify parental tension and acrimony,
the mediation process comes full circle here with the children's partic-
ipation, in fact or in spirit, as a positive influence upon the parents'
cooperative attitudes.
The close correspondence between the priorities of joint custody and
mediation, each encouraging parental cooperation and communication
on child-rearing issues, urges a marriage of the mediation process to
joint custody arrangements. A union of the two devices cannot help but
have a salutary effect on the future relationships of all members of the
family. The majority of parents who participate in mediation tend to
be greatly satisfied with the process and perceive it as fair or just. 159
Only a small percentage of those who have been exposed to mediation
turn to courts for resolution of custody diputes, with the majority of
parents forging an agreement either during or after mediation.16° Con-
fidence develops among those who have been successful in mediation
that future problems will not require resort to the courts.16' Mediated
agreements, as a result, may be "more durable than those worked out
by attorneys or imposed by judges,"' 62 with greater compliance and
better adjustment by parents. 63 Mediation may, in fact, provide parents
"with the first successful experience they have had since the failure of
their marriage. In this they are affirmed as being competent parents
who are in charge of their own destiny, able to reach decisions, and
negotiate successfully in an extremely difficult area."' 64 Even if parents
determine during or after mediation that the joint custody relationship
is no longer viable, a precedent for dialogue and cooperation has been
158. Phear, supra note 157, at 213.
159. Pearson & Theonnes, supra note 71, at 514-15.
The Pearson & Theonnes study, cited throughout this paragraph, is one of the few
which has examined the efficacy of mediation on custody and visitation disputes. Professor
Robert J. Levy has criticized the study on several grounds, including "shortcomings in
the authors empirical method" and intrusion of the authors' pro-mediation bias. See Levy,
supra note 56, at 525, 528-29. He labels the study as "advocacy disguised as research."
Id. at 533. For a response by Drs. Pearson and Theonnes, see Pearson & Theonnes,
Dialogue: A Reply to Professor Levy's Comment, 17 FAM. L.Q. 535 (1984).
160. Pearson & Theonnes, supra note 71, at 504 ("[O]ver 80 percent of those exposed
to mediation produce their own custody and visitation agreement, either during or after
the process. Less than 20 percent turn to the court for a solution. However, almost half
of those never exposed to mediation rely on the court for a decision.").
161. Id. at 505 ("[A]pproximately 70 percent of the adversarial samples and unsuc-
cessful mediation clients expect to go back to court.....
162. Id. at 509.
163. Id. at 499, 509, 515; Axelrod, Everett & Haralambie, supra note 50, at 42 (citing
Bahr, An Evaluation of Court Mediation, 2 J. FAM. IssuEs 39 (1981)).
164. Scheiner, Musetto & Cordier, supra note 19, at 105.
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established. In whatever custody arrangement that develops, the facility
of parents to cooperate and communicate will inure to the benefit of
the children.
D. Mediation" An Imperfect Solution?
Although mediation appears to provide joint custody families with a
mechanism for dispute resolution which is incredibly well suited to their
unique needs, mediation should not be mistaken for a panacea for every
conflict which may afflict the healthy operation of joint custody. Me-
diation, representing a significant step beyond judicial supervision of
family dispute resolution, may create problems which might not occur
in judicial dispute resolution and which may aggravate tensions between
joint custodians. Abuse of the mediation process by parents or by the
mediator may occur, becoming tantamount to abuse of the children. A
provision in a decree requiring mediation of family disputes prior to
judicial intervention may not be wise without some means to avert or
remedy these potential problems.
The most salient problem accompanying joint custody mediation is
the mediator's inability to compel participation by reluctant parents and
to ensure their compliance with the joint custody decree or mediated
agreements. Obviously, without parental participation or compliance,
provision for post-divorce mediation is meaningless. In most instances,
the first "agreement" between parents is a "mediation contract" which
sets forth the terms, conditions, and goals of mediation.1 65 The contract
may include a provision requiring submission of future disputes to
mediation prior to litigation, as well as provisions relating to choice of
the mediator, "the need for full disclosure, confidentiality, and the need
to make decisions in light of the children's best interests and needs."166
In most joint custody arrangements, this "contract" will be found in
joint custody separation agreements or orders and will be incorporated
into the final custody decree. Similarly, agreements created in the course
of mediation may subsequently be incorporated into the decree as
amendments. 67 These later agreements set forth the solutions arrived
at by the parents during the mediation process. 68
165. Phear, supra note 157, at 206; Axelrod, Everett & Haralambie, supra note 50,
at 47.
166. Phear, supra note 157, at 206.
167. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04 (Baldwin Supp. 1987). See also
Spencer & Zammit, supra note 24, at 934. "The accomodations reached as a result of
mediation should be incorporated into an amendment to the separation agreement. Future
disputes will then be resolved in terms of the separation agreement as so modified." Id.
168. See D. SAPOSNEK, supra note 32, at 97-99.
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In most mediation, refusal to participate in the process or to comply
with agreed upon terms may merely raise a remote threat of a breach
of contract action if damages have been incurred by the other party.169
In joint custody mediation, however, incorporation of mediated agree-
ments into the court decree may lead to more direct sanctions for
parental noncompliance. Perhaps a contempt citation will be issued
against the recalcitrant parent. Judicial impatience with parental non-
cooperation may also transform joint custody into sole custody. Thus
the mere inclusion of a provision in a decree prescribing mediation prior
to further litigation may make mediation mandatory and noncompliance
an affront to the court. Enforcibility, however, remains a serious issue
as the threat of contempt proceedings may not effectuate participation
and compliance.
When offered free mediation services, a considerable number of
disputants reject the offer outright or retreat upon initial exposure to
the process. 70 Reluctance to participate in mediation may simply "reflect
the fact that mediation is alien to the general public and/or that
disputants feel antipathy toward the prospect of cooperating with their
adversaries."' 17' In divorce mediation, custody rights are yet to be de-
termined and each parent has everything to lose and nothing to gain
by stubborn refusal to cooperate in the process. However, a parent's
stature as joint custodian may lull an abstaining parent into complacency
regarding post-divorce informal dispute resolution. Some commentators
assert that both parents' "unwillingness" to take part in mediation
indicates "the dispute may be more suited to the adversary processes,
such as arbitration or litigation."172 Without voluntary, good faith sub-
mission to the process, "mediation prior to litigation is likely to be no
more than a formality to be observed."1 73 Yet, joint custody's primary
169. See N. ROGERS & R. SALEM, supra note 62, at 151-79. Professor Nancy Rogers
also suggests that in some circumstances mediation participation and compliance may be
enforced by other devices, such as liquidated damages or penalty provisions in the original
agreement. Lecture by Professor Rogers, Ohio State University College of Law, Nov.
1984. Although somewhat extreme, perhaps courts with "friendlier parent" policies, see
supra note 125, may in the future order joint custody with a proviso that if good faith
efforts are not made to resolve disputes in mediation prior to relitigation, sole custody
will automatically be presumed to vest in the complying parent. Problems, however, may
arise in determining "good faith" and in treating the child as an "object of reward for
one parent while withheld in punishment to the other." Speca & Wehrman, supra note
10, at 8. See Trombetta, supra note 21, at 233.
170. See Pearson & Theonnes, supra note 71, at 502 (citing various *studies which
have reported high refusal and attrition rates).
171. Id.
172. See also STANDARDS FOR LAWYER MEDIATORS, supra note 96, Standard I, para.
D. ("The mediator shall instruct the participants that either of them or the mediator has
the right to suspend or terminate the process at any time."). See supra note 142, authorities
cited therein, and accompanying text.
173. Axelrod, Everett & Haralambie, supra note 50, at 47.
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frame of reference is the children, and their best interests will not be
advanced by empty formalities in parental mediation, nor by adversarial
parental posturing in litigation. To avoid this no-win situation, mandatory
mediation has increasingly been advocated and instituted for resolution
of custody disputes between parents. 74 Participation is compulsory prior
to litigation. Court sponsored programs are often suggested, 175 as they
are more visible to parents than private mediation 76 and may impress
upon parents the courts' continuing interest in their children.' 77 Man-
datory mediation in court programs can be closely monitored and parental
participation and compliance scrutinized. However, in the usual circum-
stance where court affiliated programs have not been instituted, 7 8 the
mediator, even in explicitly mandatory mediation, may be unable to
effect parental compliance with the mediation contract or with any
subsequent agreement.
In some circumstances, though, even the mediator's brief access to
joint custodians by the mediator may be sufficient to develop in them
accomodative attitudes towards mediation. Mandatory mediation requires
employment of different tactics by the mediator from those employed
in a voluntary process. 179 Therefore, the mediator may attempt persua-
sion, bordering on coercion, to move parents into compliance. Greater
emphasis on statutory or judicial policies favoring joint custody, the
more cooperative larent, the remarried father, or the maternal envi-
ronment may provide the leverage the mediator needs to elicit cooperation
174. Many writers urge mandatory mediation for custody and visitation disputes. See,
e.g., Trombetta, supra note 21, at 232; Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 12, at 498.
Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 12, at 498 n.209, indicates that some jurisdictions
"currently provide judicial authority to order litigating parties to participate in mediation,"
including, CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600 (West 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-123.5 (Supp.
1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 466-56a(c) (West Supp. 1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
13, § 725 (1982) (mandatory); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41 (West Supp. 1983); 23 PA.
CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 1006 (Purdon Supp. 1982). Id.
175. See, e.g., Grief, supra note 18, at 33 (appointment of conciliation counselors);
Meyer & Schlissel, supra note 14, at 30, col. 2; 0. COOGLER, STRUCTURED MEDIATION
IN DIVORCE SETTLEMENT (1978).
176. Meyer & Schlissel, supra note 14, at 30, col. 2.
177. Controneo, supra note 20. "By guiding a family toward post-divorce counseling,
the court lends its weight to the child's right to continuous accessibility to both parents
in a way which does not overburden the child." Id.; Nestor, Developing Cooperation
Between Hostile Parents of Divorce, 16 U.C.D. L. REv. 762, 772 (1983) ("[P]arents get
a sense-partly unconscious, partly conscious-of being part of a family network.").
178. Although court connected programs are "increasingly available to help families
make their own decisions about child custody," Folberg & Graham, supra note 2, at 536,
these programs may not find favor in areas of political and economic conservatism and
thus may be limited to large and liberal urban centers. Non-Judicial Resolution, supra
note 51, at 591. Moreover, where programs exist they may concentrate exclusively on
divorce mediation, that is, on the original custody dispute, rather than on assisting divorced
parents fine-tune discordant relationships.
179. See D. SAPOSNEK, supra note 32, at 36.
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from one or both parents. Moreover, discussion of the emotional and
economic costs of litigation as well as the overall effect of sustained
parental hostility on children may further encourage acquiescence to
the process. Threatening forfeiture of parental rights to custody, stressing
the harm which parental acrimony causes children, and examining the
costly alternative to mediation "should give embattled parents food for
serious thought."18 0 A mediator's authority, however, is usually no greater
than educative. A stubborn parent may disregard his or her admonish-
ments and withdraw from the mandatory mediation process as though
it were indeed an empty formality.
A mediator may, during mediation, encounter circumstances in joint
custody families which create doubts in his or her mind as to the wisdom
of continued mediation because of a pernicious joint custody arrange-
ment. The mediator's specific duty is "to suspend or terminate mediation
whenever continuation of the process would harm or prejudice one or
more of the participants."18' Presumably, a mediator would also have
an implicit duty to suspend or terminate mediation whenever continuation
of the underlying legal relationship of joint custody would harm one or
more participants-or interested parties, such as the children-and
mediation cannot alter or improve the situation. When parents enter
mediation with ulterior motives, mediation, though not impossible, may
be difficult to execute. For example, a mediator may discover that joint
custody was sought and obtained by the parent to wreak revenge upon
the ex-spouse, that is, only to harrass and abuse. 82 For other parents,
mediation may be simply an irritating obstacle to speedy accomplishment
of sole custody as revenge.' 83 Disruption of the process to heighten the
tension may be some parents' singular objective. On the other hand, a
mediator may encounter participants apparently agreeable to mediation
and satisfied with joint custody, but between whom there appears to
be serious problems, such as physical and/or emotional abuse, 184 which
may be warping the joint custody relationship. The mediator, uncertain
of his or her conclusions, may be reluctant to terminate mediation,
especially if retaliation by the offending spouse against the abused
parent seems possible. To make matters worse, conversely, entirely
unverifiable accusations of abuse committed by a parent against either
180. Robinson, supra note 11, at 654 n.33. See also D. SAPOSNEK, supra note 32,
at 82.
181. STANDARDS FOR FAMiLY MEDIATORS, supra note 112, at 458, Standard V.
182. D. SAPOSNEK, supra note 32, at 156; Gardner, supra note 1, at 68.
183. See D. SAPOSNEK, supra note 32, at 155.
184. For a discussion of domestic violence and mediation, see id. at 252-54. Joint
custody has been ordered in cases involving battered women. See Schulman & Pitt, supra
note 6, at 555-56; Second Thought on Joint Custody, supra note 40, at 4.
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the other parent or the children may be introduced into the proceedings. 85
In other words, the mediator may find himself mediating between parents
whose joint custody arrangements reflect the worst effects of preferences
and presumptions in favor of joint custody or of rubberstamping joint
custody separation agreements. Parents who individually or jointly exploit
joint custody to further selfish ends because of incompetence, disorder,
or uncontainable mutual hostility may similarly exploit mediation. Al-
though the mediator may terminate mediation, this will not terminate
the conflict nor its inevitable consequences for the children.
As the advocate of the children, the mediator has a special respon-
sibility to uphold their best interests. If the mediator observes and cannot
remedy abuse of the children by parents which does not amount to that
which he or she is statutorily obligated to report but which indicates
the pernicious effect of joint custody on them, what are the mediator's
options? It is urged that "the mediator has a duty to suspend or terminate
the process."' 86 The problem, however, may not be with the particular
agreement, but with the unreasonableness of the entire arrangement for
the children. Surprisingly, no authorities suggest that the mediator should
terminate or suspend mediation when the best interests of the children
are not protected. The mediator need only "inform" the parents of "this
belief and its basis." 87 The mediator may observe occasions where the
quality of parenting 88 has severely diminished during joint custody, such
as where "neither parent has power and control, and the children find
themselves in a no-man's land exposed to their parents' crossfire and
available to both as weapons." 89 One parent may consistantly be un-
available to the children and negligent in his or her care and yet be
indifferent to amending the situation. Moreover, the mediator may learn
of the children's fear of "one parent's unpredictability or abusiveness"
or of the children's adament refusal to spend time with one parent. 90
To guide the joint custody family through such difficulties and to
balance parental expectations and attitudes against the children's needs
185. The mediator may have a legal obligation to report even unverified allegations
of child abuse. For guidelines to mediators in such circumstances, see D. SAPOSNEK,
supra note 32, at 253-54.
186. STANDARDS FOR FAMILY MEDIATORS, supra note 112, at 459.
187. Id. at 457; STANDARDS FOR LAWYER MEDIATORS, supra note 96, at Standard
III, spec. consid. E.
188. See D. SAPOSNEK, supra note 32, at 259-78.
189. Gardner, supra note 1, at 67. ("The likelihood of children developing a psycho-
logical problem in such a situation is practically 100 percent.").
190. D. SAPOSNEK, supra note 32, at 81. "Obviously these situations can pose a
dilemma for the mediator, especially if her role is exclusive of arbitrating or making
recommendations. She must guide and shape the available choices to best serve the
children. As an advocate for the children, she must manuever the parents to accomodate
to the needs of their children while being sensitive to the parents' own needs." Id. See
also Miller, supra note 2, at 398.
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may be an impossible task, just as continuing joint custody may be, in
such circumstances, against the children's best interests.
When parents abuse each other and/or their children in joint custody
arrangements through or in spite of the mediation process, ideally the
court should be notified so that appropriate action may be taken. The
court, exercising its parens patriae responsibilities, may wish to disas-
semble the joint relationship and substitute the traditional sole custody
model. On the other hand, a contempt citation may be sufficient to
rectify the problem and to reinvigorate not only mediation but also joint
custody. Who will alert the court to the need for action? The mediator
although an advocate for the children has been locked in an impartial,
confidential relationship with the parents. To notify the court would not
only destroy his credibility with the parents if mediation resumes after
court intervention, but would cast a pall over all future mediation for
the family. Nor may the mediator counsel either parent to initiate court
action. This would also injure his credibility as an impartial aid to the
family and, more importantly, would constitute legal advice to a par-
ticipant, which is to be generally avoided in mediation practice in favor
of independant legal counsel.19'
For parents, there are disincentives for notifying the court of non-
compliance by an ex-spouse. Parents may reasonably anticipate a back-
lash from courts which may suspect that they, the notifying parents,
are the "unfriendly" parents, merely impatient or nitpicking in order
to obtain exclusive custody for themselves. Fathers may fear that courts
may award exclusive custody to mothers, despite their offenses, because
of maternal preferences or in the interest of stability and continuity for
the children where the mother has been the primary physical custodian.
Mothers who alert courts to abuses may be scrutinized themselves for
unusual single lifestyles and may lose custody to a remarried father.
Finally, neither parent may be willing to put children through the trauma
of what may develop into a full custody contest. They may be passively
waiting for the abuses to end on their own.
Children may suffer most from dilatory action to remedy parental
misbehavior in mediation and joint custody. Continuing acrimony be-
tween parents after divorce-in spite of a mechanism designed to
ameliorate, if not avoid such conflicts-may fuel children's suspicions
191. See STANDARDS FOR LAWYER MEDIATORS, supra note 96, Standard I, spec.
consid. H, commentary ("The mediator cannot act as lawyer for either party or for them
jointly and should make that clear to both parties."); STANDARDS FOR FAMILY MEDIATORS,
supra note 112, at 458 ("The lawyer-mediator shall not direct the decision of the mediation
participants based upon the lawyer-mediator's interpretation of the law as applied to the
facts of the situation."). The requirement that parents obtain independant legal advice
has been criticized as "adding another tier to the...process and running up the cost." See
Coombs, supra note 69, at 493 (citations omitted.).
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that they have caused the parental disharmony. Since joint custody and
mediation are primarily directed toward protecting children's best in-
terests, and because children have the most to lose from sustained
parental battle, it would seem that the children would be the most
suitable candidates to notify the courts that something has gone wrong
in joint custody. Children, however, may lack the knowledge and ma-
turity, and especially the legal status required to notify a court. Also,
they do not have a spokesperson outside of the mediation process who
can assert their individual needs before a court.
Unfortunately, even within the functioning of the mediation process
children may lack an able spokesperson for their needs. Parents are
usually given the option to select their own mediator, the only limitation
being that he or she be "mutually acceptable"1 92 and that the parental
conduct in selection does "not constitute neglect." 93 Attorneys, mental'
health professionals, 94 social workers and clergymen, 95 all may become
mediators, "anybody can become a mediator by hanging out a shingle." 96
Incompetence or misconduct among such mediators is a critical
problem for mediation. 197 Without licensing or regulation of mediators
by any governmental agencies, 198 the quality of the mediation services
available in the private sector may be unpredictable. Lawyer-mediators
who sever completely their mediation roles from their legal roles may
not be subject to disciplinary proceedings for negligence or impropriety
in their mediation practice. They, as with all other mediators, may
192. Axelrod, Everett & Haralambie, supra note 50, at 49 (usual wording in separation
contracts providing for future mediation).
193. Spencer & Zammit, supra note 24, at 919.
194. The attorney is deemed to be qualified to act as a mediator in family disputes
primarily because of his or her understanding of the court alternative to be avoided. For
example, the attorney-mediator can "identify a myriad of legal issues that must be
addressed during mediation and draft an agreement which will pass muster before the
parents' independant attorneys and later perhaps before the courts." Riskin, supra note
77, at 41. Moreover, parents "will not spend time trying to work out a settlement with
options the lawyer-mediator knows the court would not accept." Coombs, supra note 69,
at 492.
One author suggests that "good" attorneys already possess mediation skills. While
dealing with clients, attorneys must learn how to manage communication, understand
interpersonal relations and negotiations, and "be able to listen well and perceive the
underlying emotional, psychological and value orientations that may hold the keys to
resolving more quantifiable issues." Riskin, supra note 77, at 36.
195. "Ministers, priests, and rabbis with family counseling training are also potential
mediators, particularly if they have an established relationship with the family involved."
Note, supra note 51, at 591.
196. Dullea, supra note 71, at 15. "The American Bar Association's file of what it
calls mediation 'horror stories' includes complaints about practitioners described as 'Chris-
tian mediators who see the process as a spiritual one' and an unemployed steelworker
said to be drawing up settlements in South Carolina." Id.
197. M. WHEELER, supra note 38, at 211.
198. Dullea, supra note 71, at 15.
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merely expose themselves to civil actions in which a fiduciary relationship
with participants may be successfully argued but proximate cause be-
tween their alleged incompetence and the injury or a lack of actual
damages protects them.199 Community censure may, unfortunately, be
the most severe consequence for mediator misconduct.
The potential for real harm from mediator incompetence or miscon-
duct does exist. The most obvious example is where the mediator lacks
the skills or experience to deftly manage parental hostility or does not
know when to suspend or terminate the process. The mediator's uncer-
tainty and delay may exacerbate the conflict. Some mediators may be
obsessed with obtaining compromise and agreement between parents and
may intentionally prolong the proceedings to coerce compliance with
his or her expectations. 200 A private mediator's desire to secure "good
publicity" for his or her practice by successful mediation can "cloud"
his "judgment and cause him to miss signs of one party's domination
over the other."'20' When mediator self-interest supercedes concern for
participants' needs and desires, parents "may feel shortchanged, ma-
nipulated, or bullied by the mediator. This can cause one or both spouses
to sabotage the agreement shortly after mediation ends and create
resistance to future mediation for future modifications of the co-parenting
plan, because of adverse feelings about the mediator and mediation." 202
Some authorities suggest that the mediator's responsibility to the
family is not circumscribed by the time slot in which mediation is
scheduled nor by the duration of a particular controversy, but that he
or she "must be available as an advisor as the arrangement continues." 203
Therefore, misconduct by the mediator may include inaccessibility to
the family at times of crisis-for example, at 4 a.m. at a hospital when
an emergency appendectomy must be performed on a child and the
joint custodians are split as to consent. 204 In fact, it is where the children
come into the picture where mediator incompetence or misconduct can
cause the most damage. When chosen and paid by the parents and
eager to obtain a mediated settlement, the mediator may easily forget
199. Other actions against incompetent mediators are conceivable, such as breach of
contract or fraud, the latter not requiring actual damages to recover in many jurisdictions,
though often requiring actual malice.
200. See Coombs, supra note 69, at 492; L. KIEFER, supra note 72, at 45 ("The
success of mediation is usually measured by whether an agreement has been reached. It
is never measured by whether the agreement is fair, workable, or enforceable.").
201. Coombs, supra note 69, at 492.
202. D. SAPOSNEK, supra note 32, at 270.
203. Coombs, supra note 69, at 484 n.67 (quoting IRVING, DIVORCE MEDIATION, A
RATIONAL ALTERNATIVE TO THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 164 (1981)).
204. See Levy & Chambers, supra note 6, at 413. For a discussion of crises or
marathon style of mediation, see J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 162.
149
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the children's best interests, even when those interests are patently
adverse to those of their parents in a particular mediated agreement.20 5
E. Potential Improvements
Under usual circustances, mediation will amply serve the needs of
all members of a disrupted joint custody family. With hostilities di-
minished and agreements reached between parents, the joint custody
structure will be reinforced by the mediation process. Future resort to
any external dispute resolution mechanism, even future mediation, may
be unnecessary once cooperation and communication between parents
for the sake of the children have taken root in the joint custody family.
Mediation, however, like joint custody, is an imperfect instrument for
resolving all conflicts which arise between parents in the post-divorce
setting. Both substandard practices by mediators and troublesome par-
ticipation by joint custodians can negate potentially positive results from
the mediation. Solutions, however, may be offered to correct some of
these problems.
Ideally, to rectify the problems of substandard mediation, licensing
and regulation of family mediators should be established,206 with severe
sanctions for mediator misconduct or incompetence. Some commentators
suggest that mediation should be court-affiliated to insure uniformity
in the quality of service to the participants.20 7 When mediation is
conducted as part of the judicial network, though, political and philo-
sophical policies of ever-shifting domestic relations judges may influence
the nature and goals of the mediation practiced. 208 A family awarded
joint custody by a sympathetic judge may find itself later in a court-
affiliated program influenced by a newly elected judge who frowns upon
joint custody. With ever-changing judges may also come ever changing
mediators. The continuing nature of joint custody would seem to demand
consistancy and reliability of attitude and approach on the part of the
mediator, however, in addition to some familiarity by the mediator with
the individual family's particular joint custody scheme. Moreover, "court-
house" mediation programs may be more intimidating to parents than
private mediation and resort to their offices for dispute resolution may
be perceived as a mere perfunctory step requiring the parents' prior
resolve to take their dispute through the courtroom doors. Finally, "a
205. See, e.g., D. SAPOSNEK, supra note 32, at 270 ("In the mediator's vigorous
attempts to break an impasse, he or she may overlook risks to the children presented by
a particular agreement.").
206. See M. WHEELER, supra note 38, at 211 ("Certification would have to be much
more vigorous than current bar licensing.").
207. See supra notes 175-78 and accompanying text. See also M. WHEELER, supra
note 38, at 209, 211.
208. Note, supra note 51, at 590-601.
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top-heavy bureaucracy might turn a highly personal process into a
mechanical one." 209 Clearly, if state regulation of mediators does not
exist and the courts must be relied upon to assure quality mediation to
parents, mediators, though part of the court system, must remain some-
what independent of the system and must be able to deliver sensitive
and personal attention to joint custody families despite the impersonal
machinery which has created them.
When mediation has been suspended or terminated by the parents,
the next step will ordinarily be removal of the dispute to the courtroom.
To circumvent this consequence and the resulting harm to the family,
some writers urge subsequent institution of a process of arbitration to
compliment unsuccessful mediation. 21 0 The fact that an additional, al-
ternative means of dispute resolution must be employed does not render
the prior mediation superfluous, for "the unsuccessful mediation should
have narrowed and more sharply defined the issues to be resolved." 21'
If the mediator is to assume the role of impartial judge, however, this
dual role may inhibit parental candor during mediation and taint the
mediator's proposals for settlements with a more coercive flavor. More-
over, having observed the parents' behavior and attitudes during me-
diation, the mediator-arbitrator may be unable to shift to an objective
and disinterested perspective of the family dispute.212 After rendering
a decision, the likelihood that joint custody mediation of subsequent
issues will resume with the same individual presiding is small. Restoration
of impartiality, confidentiality, and trust in the mediator may be
impossible.213
In the event of unsuccessful mediation, the mediator, in another
variation of the mediation process known as "evaluative mediation," 214
may make recommendations to the court as to proper disposition of the
issues before it.215 This practice may not only compromise the confi-
dentiality and privacy 21 6 goals of the mediation, but it may increase the
209. M. WHEELER, supra note 38, at 211.
210. See Coombs, supra note 69, at 476; Spencer & Zammit, supra note 24, at 934.
211. Spencer & Zammit, supra note 24, at 934.
212. Sander, supra note 75, at 122.
213. Joint custody mediation unlike divorce mediation is not a single event or perhaps
single issue mediation. To require parents to seek out a different mediator-arbitrator for
each dispute would be in practical terms absurd.
214. See generally Hopkins, supra note 106. (This article may be the source of the
term "evaluative mediation.").
215. See Scheiner, Musetto & Cordier, supra note 19, at 104. Some mediators may
request permission to function exclusively as mediators and to have appointed separate
"evaluators." See D. SAPOSNEK, supra note 32, at 255.
216. See Axelrod, Everett & Haralambie, supra note 50, at 48 ("[W]here the mediation
is court-ordered and the mediator is required to submit recommendations if no agreement
is reached, the parties have a due process right to call the mediator to testify and be
cross-examined, unless the parties waive that right." (citation omitted)).
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efficiency and efficacy of subsequent court proceedings to determine
what is in the children's best interests. The evaluative mediator often
serves a function analogous to that of a guardian ad litem for the
children.21 7 Evaluative mediation, however, as with mediation-arbitration,
may be no more than a one time, one dispute affair, as parents may
be reluctant to resume mediation conducted by a mediator who has
made recomendations against what one or both of the parents perceive
to be their family's best interests. Likewise, the mediation process itself
may suffer from control of a mediator who may use the parents' words
and actions against them at a later time.
Evaluative mediation, however, as applied in a post-divorce context,
may come the closest to an ideal method of handling joint custody
disputes, especially when such mediation is affiliated with the courts to
supervise its quality. After all, where mediation fails to remedy the
disputes of joint custodians, the future of joint custody, itself, may be
open to doubt. The judge in reviewing a joint custody dispute may
prematurely dismiss joint custody as unworkable and impose the tra-
ditional sole custody structure upon the family, when such a drastic
measure may not be necessary, nor in the children's best interests. An
evaluative mediator may check a court's hasty actions. A more circum-
spect and punctilious judge, on the other hand, to ascertain whether a
considerable change of circumstances has occurred for the joint custody
family, may assign social workers, guardians ad litem, or other court
employees to explore the scope and ramifications of the dispute. An
evaluative mediator may be able to provide more valuable insight and
information to the court than provided by expensive strangers to the
family and the dispute. An evaluative mediator may be an invaluable
asset to a court in determining the continued viability of joint custody
and the adjustment of the participants, especially that of the children,
to the arrangement.
Some commentators declare that neither courts nor mediators asso-
ciated with the family should wait for failure of a dispute resolution
process to occur before evaluation of the joint custody arrangement is
performed. Periodic review by mediators associated with the court can
provide "a safety valve" and "valuable support for the parents and
children as well as a tool for assessing the viability of an arrangement
having less than ideal circumstances.. '218 This "follow-up" could be
arranged at reasonable intervals throughout the life of the joint custody
arrangement; upon the occurrence of certain anticipated contingencies,
such as remarriage, relocation, or schedule changes of one or both joint
217. Hopkins, supra note 106, at 64.
218. Steinman, supra note 6, at 760. See also Scheiner, Musetto & Cordier, supra
note 19, at 104.
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custodians;2 9 or simply at the end of trial periods for some of the
arrangements. 220 Some mediators include in each agreement a provision
for a later follow-up mediation to reevaluate the particular agreement's
continued viability.221 Parental expectations that after a period of time
"they will return to mediation rather than to court may well set a
context for the parents to take responsibility for resolving future problems
on their own." 222 Courts and mediators should not presume that "if
parents do not come back to court [or mediation], the arrangement
must be working well. This may be an unfounded assumption, particularly
with regard to the children." 223 The mediator with responsibility to the
family members and to the court, can "monitor how a particular
arrangement is working and ... support parents and children in joint
custody.
' 224
Evaluative mediators are perhaps in the best position to discover
whether joint custody has been operating in the children's best interests.
Some connection with the court may be essential. Not only would a
connection insure the quality of the services, but a court's influence
might guarantee the mediator's focus on the best interests of the children.
Parents may deem a court employee impartial and objective even after
a recommendation which displeases them.221 Moreover, courts may give
such mediators' evaluations more weight because of their affiliation. If
the mediator is additionally empowered with a monitoring function to
notify a court when circumstances of the joint custody family severely
threaten the best interests of the children or the welfare of one or both
of the parents, and, thereby, the future viability of the joint custody,
then the mediator would be a powerful agent of the family's future and
a true advocate of the children. Courts with such personnel on hand
219. See, e.g., Gaddis, supra note 150, at 21.
220. See Scheiner, Musetto & Cordier, supra note 19, at 104. See also Gardner,
supra note 1, at 66. Some states require that trial periods be incorporated into every
joint custody decree. In Ohio, for example, every joint custody decree is "provisional"
for ninety days and may be terminated upon motion of either parent, or of the court,
within such period. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.04 (Baldwin Supp. 1986).
221. D. SAPOSNEK, supra note 32, at 113 ("[T]he mediation agreement should not
be viewed as a final decree. Hence, provisions must be made for future modifications of
the agreement should any of its clauses not prove tenable for any reason.").
222. Id. at 114.
223. Steinman, supra note 6, at 760.
224. Id. The author, Susan Steinman, a leading advocate for joint custody and herself
a mediator, suggests referral to a mediator "outside of the court process." Actually her
wording is ambiguous for the phrase may modify "counseling service" also, indicating
that referral to counseling services outside the court system is desirable while mediation
need not be independent. A mediator not associated with the courts, it would seem, would
be of little utility in monitoring joint custody.
225. Axelrod, Everett & Haralambie, supra note 50, at 48. ("However, parties who
utilize court-sponsored mediation typically do not have the ability to choose a compatible
mediator, as they would in the private sector because the range of choice is limited.").
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may be less reluctant to initially award or later retain joint custody for
the family after acrimonious parental litigation. An alarm system within
earshot of the court has been established.
Fortunately, courts need not create elaborate specialized programs
to provide evaluative and monitoring mediation services for joint custody
arrangements. Most jurisdictions already have such mediators available
or have the resources to readily provide them. Guardians ad litem may
most ably serve the dual function of mediators and monitors for joint
custody families. Within the mediation process, or in subsequent liti-
gation, there may be no better spokesperson for or protector of the
children's best interests than the guardian ad litem. If mediation applied
in conjunction with the joint custody framework represents a liberating
full step away from traditional dispute resolution systems which threaten
parental autonomy and the children's best interests, employment of the
guardian ad litem in this new capacity represents a necessary half step
back into those systems necessary to check the quality of mediation, of
co-parenting, and of joint custody.
III. GUARDIANS AD LITEM AS MEDIATORS AND
MONITORS OF JOINT CUSTODY FAMILIES:
THE ULTIMATE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS
Guardians ad litem traditionally have served as special guardians to
legally incompetent parties to litigation. Unlike general guardians, their
limited powers and authority have been restricted to prosecution and
defense of their wards' actions. 226 Although children are not deemed
formal parties in their parents' battles for their care and control, guard-
ians ad litem have gradually been used to represent the childrens'
independent interests in custody and visitation disputes. 227 In this context,
226. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 635 (5th ed. 1979); Comment, Protecting the
Interests of Children in Custody Proceedings: A Perspective on Twenty Years of Theory
Practice in the Appointment of Guardians Ad Litem, 12 CREIGHTON L. REv. 234 (1978).
Although required by statute in some states, guardians ad litem need not be attorneys.
See Long, When the Client Is a Child: Dilemmas in the Lawyer's Role, 21 J. FAM. L.
607, 611 n.9 (1982-1983). However, many courts without statutory directive reside their
trust in attorneys almost exclusively to perform this important role. Judge Henry T.
Webber, Domestic Relations and Juvenile Divisions, Court of Common Pleas, Lorain
County, Ohio prefers that attorneys assume the guardian ad litem function because
"attorneys know the system...are screened to a certain degree before they enter the system,
and enjoy a reputation of demonstrated ability of working in these troubled situations."
Conversation with Judge Henry T. Webber, Domestic Relations and Juvenile Divisions,
Court of Common Pleas, Lorain County, Ohio (Dec. 30, 1987). For the purposes of this
article, it shall be assumed that the guardians ad litem discussed are attorneys.
227. Comment, supra note 226, at 234. There is growing support among family law
commentators to upgrade children's status in custody litigation to that of an essential
[Vol. 3:1 1987]
GUARDIAN AD LITEM
guardians' powers may vary from neutral factfinders to child advocates.
However, their focus remains constant. Guardians ad litem ensure that
the children's rights and best interests are not misread, minimized, or
neglected by parents or courts. 221 "Either at [their] discretion or pursuant
to statutory mandate, 229 courts-representing the state as party to the
divorce action-exercise their parens patriae authority to protect children
who are unable to protect themselves by appointing guardians ad litem. 20
A. The Need for Guardians Ad Litem in Custody Disputes
The rationale behind application of the guardian ad litem device to
custody proceedings tracks that which underlies the development of
joint custody and custody mediation. The courts are unsuitable forums
for determination and protection of the best interests of children. First,
the imprecise "best interests" standard itself argues for enlistment of
guardians ad litem to assist courts in analyzing its proper application
in a particular case. The controlling test, "the best interests of the
children," demands of courts "an ability to foresee the development of
the relationships between" children and parents and "to make deter-
minations absent specific guidelines regarding which social forms, con-
ventions, and behavior produce the most well-adjusted and socially
productive persons." 1 The guardian ad litem, though no guarantor of
party. See, e.g., J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CHILD 65 (1979). Speca & Wehrman, supra note 10, at 23-25, 37 (rights of
children to intervene in divorce action); Felner, Farber & Kent, supra note 4, at 307; D.
SAPOSNEK, supra note 32, at 67. One writer argues, however, that the "child is not a
party but rather is the individual whose interests-once determined-must by law prevail."
Note, supra note 14, at 1155.
228. The guardian ad litem acts as "a persistent reminder that the child is not merely
an object to be awarded to the more deserving parent." Note, supra note 14, at 1137.
229. Comment, supra note 226, at 235, 248. The inherent power of the courts to
appoint guardians ad litem for children in custody cases is explained in Levin, supra note
40, at 364, and Speca & Wehrman, supra note 10, at 29 ("[S]imply another manifestation
of the power of equity to protect the interests of the child."). See also Barth v. Barth,
12 Ohio Misc. 141, 225 N.E.2d 866 (Stark C.P. 1967).
Some commentators argue that in every divorce action "only the mandatory appointment
of guardians ad litem can adequately safeguard the interests of the child." Comment,
supra note 226, at 254. See Casasanto, supra note 40, at 58; Levin, supra note 40, at
349, 364. Constitutional due process should demand it. See Speca, Representation for
Children in Custody Disputes: Its Time has Come, 48(3) U.M.K.C. L. REV. 328, 333-
34 (1980). In Wisconsin, guardians are appointed in every case where custody is contested.
See Wendland v. Wendland, 29 Wis. 2d 145, 156, 138 N.W.2d 185, 191 (1965). But no
state requires appointment in every case of divorce. Ardagh, California Civil Code Section
4606: Separate Representation for Children in Dissolution Custody Proceedings, 14 U.S.F.
L. REV. 571, 577 (1980).
230. Speca & Wehrman, supra note 10, at 15. Formerly, the parens patriae doctrine
was invoked to justify denial of independent representation for children on the grounds
that the court could ably serve and protect the children's best interests. Although this
attitude still remains popular, the trend is away from it. See Comment, supra note 226,
at 240.
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better application of the test,23 2 may provide additional information and
insight on the children's best interests to guide a court toward proper
decision-making. Secondly, the "gradual end of absolute rights of
parents" 233 and recognition of children's rights234 "to be treated as ...
interested and affected person[s] and not ... as pawn[s], possession[s],
or chattel[s] of either or both parents 235 have contributed to increasing
adoption of guardians ad litem in custody cases. Children have "the
right to be heard and listened to," and the right to "have standing in
legal proceedings to assert [their] claims of interest" 236-"the conceptual
right to be represented by a guardian ad litem."' 237 Finally, supporters
of the guardian ad litem mechanism join advocates for custody mediation
and joint custody in lamenting the unsuitablity of the adversary format
when a child's custody is disputed.238 Unlike their fellow innovators,
however, proponents of the guardian ad litem mechanism have reconciled
themselves to the fact that the adversary system remains firmly en-
trenched in our legal system in cases involving children.239 The use of
guardians ad litem in custody cases is intended to mollify the tenor of
the proceedings from accusatorial, as between parents, to inquisitorial,
as between the court and the children's needs, desires, and best interests.
Neither courts nor parents are always capable of providing necessary
protection to children's rights and interests within adversarial contests.
Traditionally, judges have been assigned the role as the children's
spokespersons responsible for their protection from adversary proceed-
ings. However, with practical limitations on their time and quality of
contact with the children, judges may not always adequately perform
this function.2 0 The various investigative or social agency experts enlisted
231. Mlyniec, The Child Advocate in Private Custody Disputes: A Role in Search
of a Standard, 16(1) J. FAM. L. 1, 12 (1977-1978).
232. See generally id. at 4, 11-13.
233. Id. at 5.
234. Id. at 2, 5; Note, supra note 51, at 587. See also infra notes 235-36 and
authorities cited therein.
235. Hansen, The Role and Rights of Children in Divorce Actions, 6 J. FAM. L. 1,
5 (1966). See also Speca & Wehrman, supra note 10, at 7.
236. Foster & Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAM. L.Q. 343, 355 [hereinafter
A Bill of Rights]. The authors of this article are also leading proponents for joint custody.
See generally 4 Viable Alternative, supra note 6; Foster & Freed, supra note 17. Professor
Foster is an advocate for mandatory appointment of counsel for the children in every
instance of a "marital breakdown" (see Levin, supra note 40, at 365; Letter to Levin,
(Oct. 2, 1973)), a fact implied but not explicit in A Bill of Rights, supra at 353-56.
237. Levin, supra note 40, at 357 (emphasis omitted).
238. Id. at 349; Note, supra note 12, at 1135; Comment, supra note 226, at 240;
Barth v. Barth, 12 Ohio Misc. 141, 224 N.E.2d 866, 867 (Stark C.P. 1967) ("A child
by definition, is inherently unequal in a contest based upon a system of law...the adversary
process...that contemplates a contest of reasonably equal parties.").
239. A Bill of Rights, supra note 236, at 356. See Levin, supra note 40, at 349.
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by courts and parents to augment the judicial role may likewise, lacking
sufficient intimacy with the children and their parents' controversy, fail
to improve the children's circumstances in court. 241 Furthermore, courts
by trying to simultaneously supervise the proceedings and speak for the
children's best interests are forced "to assume two conflicting roles-
advocate and arbiter-to the ultimate detriment of both. 242
Usually, evidence to decide custody is presented to a court by the
parents through their lawyers. Although in other circumstances parents
may be regarded as reliable spokespersons for their children, in the
custody arena, "neither parent can be presumed to be the exclusive
representative of the child ... and [n]either parent can be relied on to
communicate to the court the child's interests that differ from those of
one or both parents. '243 Indeed, the children's interests may be sub-
stantially incompatible with or adverse to those of either or both parents
in a custody action.244 Evidence presented in such cases, where relative
240. Note, supra note 14, at 1136 ("[Jludge is restricted to the courtroom and cannot
on his own obtain the facts pertaining particularly to the child's viewpoint."); Levin, supra
note 40, at 347 ("[J]udge is not trained in the behavioral or social sciences"), at 348
("A relatively brief, one-time communication between a judge and a small child is inherently
limited in its effectiveness."); Meyer & Schlissel, supra note 14, at 30, col. 2 ("No matter
how conscientious the trial judge, he has neither the time nor the means to investigate
the underlying circumstances that an independent representative of the child would have.").
One Ohio judge has pointed out the special problems some domestic relations courts
have in Ohio in ascertaining the best interests of the children. "In divorce proceedings
it is harder to generate information because there is not enough control over the proceedings
as there is in juvenile cases.... The juvenile court has a great deal of authority to investigate
and more personnel. If there is no [separate] domestic relations court," the court which
hears divorces "is the step-child of the general division. If a domestic relations division
exists, there is not the necessary personnel because of lack of interest or funding."
Furthermore, other issues for decision may distract the resources and attention of the
court in divorce proceedings, such as pertain to alimony and property division and marital
fault. Conversation with the Honorable Henry T. Webber, Domestic Relations and Juvenile
Divisions, Court of Common Pleas, Lorain County, Ohio (Dec. 30, 1987).
241. First, note that guardians ad litem provide "a different perspective and set of
skills" than investigative agency and social agency personnel. Note, supra note 14, at
1177. Repeatedly, it has been pointed out by the commentators, the experts employed
by a court to facilitate its fact-finding do not succeed in fulfilling their responsibilities.
See id. at 1178 (reports inaccurate and incomplete), at 1179 ("Family Relations information
on the child...found to be misleading and superficial"), at 1180 (parents "shopping" for
experts); Mlyniec, supra note 231, at 2 ("[E]xperts have failed in their roles"); Casasanto,
supra note 40, at 37 n.10 ("[P]robation study...cannot...substitute for the child's independent
representation").
242. Ardagh, supra note 229, at 573. The problem of conflicting roles of advocate
and arbiter for judges may also affect mediator-arbitrators.
243. Note, supra note 14, at 1134.
244. See id. at 1138; D. SAPOSNEK, supra note 32, at 67; Comment, supra note 226,
at 241; Barth v. Barth, 12 Ohio Misc. 141, 335 N.E.2d 866, 867 (Stark C.P. 1967) ("[I]t
is well recognized by this court, and given legislative recognition in some states (for
example Wisconsin), that in some divorce cases, the interests of the minor children are,
or may be, substantially different from either or both of the parents. In such cases, the
child may well receive inadequate protection in the adversary system of divorce."); Speca,
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parental fitness is weighed by inscrutable standards, may be "colored
by the biases of the parents whose primary concern is to discredit the
other in the eyes of the court. '245 The degeneration of parent-child
relationships, which occurs frequently during and after divorce litiga-
tion,246 argues further against parental representation of their children's
interests during a major family crisis. Parents may simply be out of
touch with their children's needs or desires. Attorneys for the parents
must represent their clients' interests exclusively,247 even if they have
"personal reservations about the qualifications of [a] client as a custodial
parent." 248 If the attorneys for the parents are deemed to represent the
children in addition to their adult clients, they may wrestle with many
ethical problems. These include obtaining consent to dual representation
from the children by meaningful disclosure of the potential for conflicts
-of interest,249 and avoiding influence from the paying parents over their
professional judgments.250 When actual conflicts arise, the attorneys
must confront another dilemma, namely, the necessity of withdrawal
from one or both clients' representation. 251 Neither parents nor children
can benefit from advocacy by an attorney caught in such binds. In
many circumstances, separate representation for the children may be
the only solution.
Parents, their attorneys, and the courts cannot, in most custody cases,
sufficiently protect the children's interests. In joint custody disputes,
the presence of these deficiences may be more prevalent. The necessity
supra note 229, at 337 ("[Tlhat the interests of the child and the interests of both of
the parents are identical... [is] an absurd supposition on its face, since the interests of the
parents conflict....").
245. Casasanto, supra note 40, at 37. See Levin, supra note 40, at 350. See also
Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 193 (1962).
246. See J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 21, at 109 ("[T]wo-thirds of
mother-child relationships"), at 117 ("[D]ecreased physical and emotional availability.").
During joint custody relitigation if joint child care continues, one can imagine either
improvement or deterioration of this situation. Shuttling between homes can provide a
"protective buffering mechanism" so that together the parents provide adequate care for
the children. See Clingenpeel & Repucci, supra note 19, at 109. On the other hand, the
children in such instance may suffer greater harm from having joint custodial parents.
Frequent contact with both angry parents may intensify children's sense of guilt.
247. See D. SAPOSNEK, supra note 32, at 273 ("Even when lawyers are functioning
in their least adversarial way, they are bound by professional ethics to represent their
client, and only their client, to the best of their abilities."). See also, e.g., MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-1, DR 7-101 (1980).
248. Ardagh, supra note 229, at 573 n.7. See Levin, supra note 40, at 342.
249. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(A), DR 5-105(A),
(C) (1980). See also Genden, Separate Legal Representation for Children: Protecting the
Rights and Interests of Minors in Judicial Proceedings, 11 HAPv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
565, 587 (1976). But cf. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 227, at 114
(no conflict because lawyer represents "the family's interests"). Note that "situational"
representation has been criticized. See Crouch, Divorce Mediation and Legal Ethics, 16
FAM. L.Q. 219, 228 (1982).
250. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-107(B) (1980).
251. Genden, supra note 249,. at 587.
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of continued quality contact between children and both their divorced
parents is virtually unchallenged among mental health professionals and
is developing as a fundamental legal precept in many jurisdictions. When
joint custodians elect further litigation over cooperation, especially after
proceeding through mediation, they endanger the future viability of joint
custody, the arrangement arguably most conducive for perpetuating this
context. The children's best interests in many circumstances may be in
maintaining, at minimum, the integrity of the conceptual foundations
of joint custody, that is, retaining joint legal custody after litigation.
One or both of the parents may, prior to or during litigation, demand
nothing less than exclusive custody, not yielding even minimal visitation
rights to his or her adversary. To imagine a scenerio where parental
and children's interests could be more incompatible or adverse would
be difficult. Should even one parent align him or herself with the
children to argue for retention of joint custody, doubts may be raised
as to that parent's motivations. Possibly, strategies to reunite, revenge,
or conceal are being executed. Joint custody, in fact, may not be in
the children's best interests.
To avoid depriving children of a workable arrangement which has
been only temporarily disrupted by parental self-interest, or to avoid
the maintenence of a malignant system which may return to haunt the
court, a court must marshal all of its powers to closely scrutinize the
joint custody dispute. An independent advocate for the children or a
powerful factfinder representing to the court the children's orientation
in the dispute would be an invaluable tool to facilitate exploration of
the depth and reach of the controversy. These forms of representation,
of course, would be a tremendous benefit to decision-making in any
custody action. However, "the need for such representation will be even
greater when the custodial agreement is for joint custody, for by its
very nature ... joint-custody ... requires even deeper, more incisive
insight on the part of the trial judge than does ... sole custody. ' 's52
B. Factfinder or Advocate
Already existing within the machinery of the adversary system is an
instrument to serve the children's best interests and the court's decision-
making needs in such representative capacity. Guardians ad litem,
depending upon their "historical usage, the type of litigation, and which
trial court is involved,"' 3 may function as either factfinders or child
252. Meyer & Schlissel, supra note 14, at 30, cols. 2-3. But cf. Mayer v. Mayer, 150
N.J. Super. 556, 376 A.2d 214, 218 (N.J. Ch. 1977) (contested joint custody case where
court denied use of separate counsel for the children).
253. Chambers, The Ambiguous Role of the Lawyer Representing the Minor in
Domestic Relations Litigation, 70 ILL. B.J. 510 (1982).
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advocates or both. 25 4 Regardless of designation, their duty in custody
proceedings is essentially the same-to represent the best interests of
the child,25 5 because "without separate legal representation, the child's
interests are left to the inadequate protection of parents and the courts. '256
Either as factfinders or as advocates for the children, guardians ad
litem may meaningfully contribute to the proper functioning of a court
attempting to determine children's best interests.
In some jurisdictions, guardians ad litem257 function as factfinders,
that is, as investigators and advisors to the court.258 Acting initially
independently from the court, the impartial, inquisitorial factfinder 259
investigates and protects the individual desires and needs of the children
in the litigation and insures "that all considerations regarding the best
interests of the child[ren] will have been brought to the court's atten-
tion." 260 Though usually required to make a report to the court of the
inquiry's results, he or she may26 1 or may not 262 make custody recom-
mendations to the court. The guardian ad litem factfinder may263 or
254. Which function, factfinder or child advocate, is to be employed may depend on
the status of the children in the litigation. If children are made parties, the child advocate
mechanism may be employed, though this is not necessarily a condition of its use. See
Levin, supra note 40, at 363.
255. Mlyniec, supra note 231, at 8.
256. Note, supra note 14, at 1133-34. See also Comment, supra note 226, at 242.
257. The term "guardian ad litem" has a "large number of meanings, including that
of any legal representative for a child for the duration of a suit." Note, supra note 14,
at 1140. Here, however, "the nonadvocate representative for the child is more properly
denominated a factfinder." Id. at 1141.
Generally there is much confusion in the literature as to the proper designation for
the particular function the so-called guardian ad litem performs. Depending upon the
commentators reviewed, either or both factfinder or advocate fuiction may be attributed
to the "guardian ad litem." In some instances it is difficult to ascertain whether the
writers are speaking of the factfinder or of the advocate when using the term "guardian
ad litem." Usually one will observe that the term is attached to the factfinder role and
the advocate role will be denominated as "child advocate," "counsel for the children,"
or merely as the "attorney."
258. See Casasanto, supra note 40, at 47; Long, supra note 226, at 617 (guardian
ad litem as amicus curiae).
259. It is repeatedly emphasized that the factfinder must be neutral or impartial. See
Note, supra note 14, at 1141; Ardagh, supra note 229, at 600; Genden, supra note 249,
at 573; Speca, supra note 229, at 337.
260. Note, supra note 14, at 1141 (footnotes omitted). See also Levin, supra note
40, at 362.
261. Speca, supra note 229, at 331-32 ("The guardian would, at the minimum, consult
with and counsel with the judge."); Ardagh, supra note 229, at 600 ("[M]ake a rec-
ommendation as to what type of custody arrangement would, in his or her opinion, best
meet the child's best interests.").
262. Note, supra note 14, at 1141 (The factfinder does not "advocate a particular
placement decision."). See also Mlyniec, supra note 231, at 16 (strictly limited to stating
child's preference as determined by social worker.).
263. Speca, supra note 229, at 332 ("He would be an officer of the court and would
participate in all proceedings.").
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may not264 participate in the proceedings, depending upon the court.
In other jurisdictions, 265 legal advocacy for the children is regarded
as the more appropriate function for the guardians ad litem.266 Because
the custody issue is, after all, "legal to the extent that it must ultimately
be heard by the court, the child needs a lawyer to manage the process
of litigation" 267 and "to vigorously present the [child] client's case with
the same powers as employed by the attorneys for the parents.
'268
Zealous representation of the children frees "parents' lawyers to give
their own clients undiluted loyalty. ' 269 Like the factfinder, although in
a more formal manner, the child advocate bears responsibility to provide
unbiased information to a court regarding the children's best interests. 270
At times, the guardian ad litem must use his or her professional judgment
264. Note, supra note 14, at 1141 ("[H]e does not necessarily participate in the
trial."); Ardagh, supra note 229, at 600 ("This kind of representation would not in-
clude...taking any active role in the hearing; the advocacy would be left to the attorneys
for the parents.").
265. See, e.g., Casasanto, supra note 40, at 47 ("Many legal scholars and at least
two state courts have...conclu[ded] that advocacy is the proper role." (citations omitted.));
Note, supra note 14, at 1139 ("Many statutes explicitly require that the representative...be
an attorney [and] urge conferral of party status on the child to clear the way for legal
advocacy available to adults." (citations omitted)).
266. See Veazy v. Veazy, 560 P.2d 382, 390 (Alaska 1977) ("When a child needs a
guardian ad litem, he needs an advocate-someone who will plead his cause as forcefully
as the attorneys for each competing claimant plead theirs.").
The Honorable Henry T. Webber, Judge of the Domestic Relations and Juvenile
Divisions of the Court of Common Pleas, Lorain County, Ohio, for sixteen years, requires
that "the child has an advocate...to speak for the child" because "too often the child
falls into the cracks of the system." In his court, the guardian ad litem is "required to
participate in the trial." Judge Webber, however, recognizes the "clouded" role of guardian
ad litem in different Ohio jurisdictions, recalling one panel on which he served which
had three judges "who utilized guardians ad litem in three different ways." Seminar on
"Guardian Ad Litem," Lorain County, Ohio (Dec. 8, 1987).
267. Note, supra note 14, at 1185.
268. Ardagh, supra note 229, at 601.
269. Note, supra note 14, at 1150.
270. Mlyniec, supra note 231, at 12; Casasanto, supra note 40, at 37; Chambers,
supra note 253, at 514 ("You also serve as a 'friend of the court' in that you have the
responsibility of insuring that all material evidence relating to the best interests of your
client is made part of the record," quoting in guidelines given to guardians ad litem in
Wisconsin.).
The attorney's duty to preserve the confidences and secrets of the children, see MODEL
CODE OF PROFSSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1980), severely inhibits this function.
The attorney for the children may not advise or consult with the judge in some jurisdictions.
See Holz, The Child Advocate in Private Custody Disputes: The Wisconsin Experience,
16 J. FAM. L. 739, 741 (1977-1978). Confidentiality restrictions, however, must he balanced
against the advocates' "statutory and ethical obligations to act in the client's best interest"
and at times the guardian ad litem should be permitted to share information with parents,
social workers, and the court without the child-client's consent. Long, supra note 226, at
622 (discussion of guardian's ad litem dilemmas). By contrast, the factfinder and "child
are not necessarily covered under the common law privilege of attorney-client confiden-
tiality." Chambers, supra note 253, at 511.
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to "independently interpret and formulate his client's interests," 271 but
"the child's desires should direct the attorney's investigation and ar-
guments in the case. '272 In fact, guardians ad litem as advocates for
the children possess the same restrictions, prerogatives and professional
rights and responsibilities as do legal counsel for adults in adversary
proceedings. 27 3 Thus, the child advocate may exercise a power never
afforded to the factfinder guardian ad litem-the right to appeal a
decision patently adverse to the children's best interests.274
Though they may be conceptually pigeonholed as either factf'mders
or advocates, in practice guardians ad litem may possess an "authority
greater than that traditionally accorded to either" of the roles by virtue
of the character of custody disputes.275 A blending of the roles276 may
be demanded by the guardians' mandate to obtain for the children the
"totality of benefits that might have been expected if it had not been
for" their parents' conflict.277 Child advocates may in practice assume
child-protective functions. Factfinders, on occasion, may by necessity
undertake advocacy responsibilities. Limiting guardians ad litem to
"traditional or restricted role conceptions" undermines their protective
purposes, for they have been appointed as representatives for the
children.278 Narrow theoretical models must yield to the practicalities
of representation of children's needs during the tension of parental
battles.279
C. A New Role for the Guardian Ad Litem
The combined roles of factfinder and child advocate also belong to
another entity within the sphere of child custody law, the custody
mediator, who employs both factfinding and advocacy skills in mediation
to focus parental decision-making on the children's best interests. That
271. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 6, at 67. See also Mlyniec,
supra note 231, at 12.
272. Note, supra note 14, at 1146 (citation omitted).
273. Chambers, supra note 253, at 511; Holz, supra note 270, at 741; Mlyniec, supra
note 231, at 12; Levin, supra note 40, at 363-64.
274. Chambers, supra note 253, at 511, 514; Levin, supra note 40, at 363.
275. Mlyniec, supra note 231, at 9.
276. Speca, supra note 229, at 332 n.23 (discussing statutory duties of guardians ad
litem). See, e.g., Mlyniec, supra note 232, at 11 n.75 (advocate as witness when children
"unwilling or unable to make a choice regarding custody or when the advocate substitutes
his judgment for the client's stated decision").
277. Barth v. Barth, 12 Ohio Misc. 141, 142, 225 N.E.2d 866, 867-68 (Stark C.P.
1967).
278. Note, supra note 14, at 1146-48, 1150, 1153 ("In sum, attorneys who labeled
themselves factfinders frequently described ways in which they evaluated evidence, shaped
an argument for the court, decided to curtail an investigation, and negotiated settlements.
The one attorney who confined himself to investigation concluded that this failed to
protect the interests of the child."). See also id. at 1157.
279. A discussion of the disparity between the conceptual and practical responsibilities
of guardians ad litem may be found in id. at 1153-54.
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execution of these functions is directed by the mediator to parental
decision-making and by the guardian ad litem to judicial decision-making
merely reflects the forum within which each usually operates. At times
mediators may be enlisted by the courts to perform functions analogous
to those of guardians ad litem, such as evaluation and recommendation
to the courts of the children's best interests. Guardians ad litem also,
at times, cross over into the realm of mediation practice, although
usually without official directive.2 0 Guardians ad litem, prior to judicial
decision-making, may actually attempt to mediate between parents.
Indeed, both factfmders and child advocates have been observed to
provide negotiation, counseling, and mediation services for parents. 28'
Commentators tend to include these functions in descriptions of essential
responsibilities for guardians ad litem. 282 As will be examined below,
"the child's representative in the custody suit is ideally placed to facilitate
settlement. ' 283 Thus, between guardians ad litem and mediators, only
the forum and stage of parental conflict may distinguish the guardians'
and mediators' roles as representatives of the children's best interests.
Before parental conflict becomes so spirited that judicial intervention
is required, parents may turn the dispute over to a mediator. The
mediator will explore the familial relationships in light of the children's
needs and desires and use this information to encourage and develop
resolution for the dispute. If unsuccessful, the family may find itself in
court, where a guardian ad litem may be appointed to repeat the process
undertaken by the mediator in order to ascertain the children's best
interests.284 There is an obvious redundancy here. Use of an evaluative
280. See Note, supra note 14, at 1154, 1173. In the study of guardians ad litem
conducted and reported in id., generally, only one attorney had been asked by the court
to mediate. Id. at 1184.
281. Id. at 1147-48, 1150.
282. See L. KIEFER, supra, note 72, at 175 ("[T]he attorney for the children as a
negotiator...may spark meaningful discussion about what the children's needs are and how
best to resolve them."); Speca, supra note 230, at 341 ("He or she can serve as an
arbitrator and conciliator between warring parents."); Casasanto, supra note 40, at 53-54
("He or she could assist in negotiating a visitation schedule."); Speca & Wehrman, supra
note 10, at 39 ("A kind of arbitrator between warring parents."); Non-Judicial Resolution,
supra note 51, at 587.
283. Note, supra note 14, at 1155.
The author of this Note points out that "counsel for the child is well situated to fulfill
the following functions of the mediator: (1) diminish conflict by facilitating reliable
communication between parties; (2) reduce the stress and intensity of conflict that lead
to defensive and diametrically opposed positions; (3) clarify the real issues of conflict by
helping the parties identify where they agree and disagree; and (4) alter or compensate
for asymmetries in motivation or power between the conflicting parties." Id. at 1174-75.
284. The primary difference between the guardian ad litem's methods and those of
the mediator is that the mediator may confine him or herself to the mediation sessions
to uncover facts, whereas the guardian ad litem is much more likely to speak with the
children separately as well as seek to interview parents informally in other surroundings
to gauge their credibility. See Note, supra note 14, at 1136 n.47.
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mediator in court, instead of a guardian ad litem, might avoid this
problem. However, using a guardian ad litem as a mediator before
litigation has been contemplated may be a better solution. The difference
is not simply semantic. A guardian ad litem could bring to the mediation
process benefits beyond the reach of evaluative mediators. Guardians
ad litem as mediators may be the best means currently available to
safeguard the best interests of children in custody disputes, especially
those of children in joint custody families.
Some commentators have approached the guardian ad litem-mediator
concept but have not quite arrived at its endorsement. Usually when
discussing reform of child custody law, they advocate utilization of
mediation programs as they simultaneously speak of employment of
guardians ad litem in an ancillary role. At mediation sessions, "the
representative can serve as a court watchdog to help assure that the
best interests of the children are protected in such dispute resolution
situations." 285 One analysis of an evaluative mediation system describes
many of its functions as similar to those which a guardian ad litem
would perform.2 6 Joint custody commentators have embraced the ap-
plication of mediation and guardians ad litem services to custody disputes,
but they have never quite pieced them together in a complete, unified
mechanism. 2 7 Employment of guardians ad litem as mediators for joint
custody families, however, completes a very important puzzle: How to
ensure that the best interests of the children are not neglected in
mediation? Only one commentator has observed the obvious connection:
"Since the guardian owes allegiance only to the children, he or she
could serve as mediator for any ... disputes that may come up and
possibly negate any further court action. '288
Probably the most important benefit from the use of guardians ad
litem as mediators to joint custody families is the certainty that children's
best interests will be addressed during the mediation and in formulation
of parental agreement. The guardian ad litem, who normally functions
as an advocate, will no doubt press forward with the children's interests
constantly when parents ignore them. Even the impartial factfinder will
assume the advocate role easily during mediation. "Although the fact-
285. Davidson & Gerlach, supra note 37, at 249. See also generally Levin, supra
note 40, at 366 (family court advocated with guardians ad litem to serve the family
during litigation and with conciliation and counseling afterwards).
286. See Hopkins, supra note 106, at 64.
287. See Foster & Freed, supra note 17, at 24, 27; Steinman, supra note 6, at 760-
61 (The author has juxtaposed two sections, "Follow-up" and "Input from Children," the
former urging post-divorce mediation and counseling services and the latter suggesting
use of "a neutral person, trained in general and divorce-specific assessment of children
[to] play an important role in representing the children's separate concerns and point of
view and in providing input into the decision making process.").
288. Casasanto, supra note 40, at 54.
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finder is introduced as an impartial investigator, he is to be impartial
only with regard to the parents, and even then, only initially. Entrusted
with finding information pertinent to the child's interest, the factfimder
ends up looking very much like the advocate. ' 289 In addition to their
natural advocacy roles, guardians ad litem bring with them a sensitivity
to children's special problems in custody disputes290 and to their need
to be heard and listened to during parental battles.29' Other mediators
who are over-anxious to achieve parental agreement may neglect these
needs when the parents appear to be amenable to a suspicious settle-
ment.292 The guardian ad litem cannot neglect these needs. In fact, with
a primary and special duty to the children, guardians ad litem may be
the only mediators who will arrive at the hospital in the middle of the
night to attempt crisis mediation before the judge needs to be awakened.
To neglect these needs would certainly bring heavy judicial censure and
disciplinary action to the attorney guardian ad litem.293 In contrast,
private attorney mediators, will not worry about risking loss of license
if their mediation and legal practices are totally segregated. Non-attorney
mediators need only worry about loss of referrals, and possibly, the
remote chance of contempt action.
Guardians ad litem carry into joint custody dispute resolution one
additional asset which militates most strongly for their adoption into
this sphere of custody law. Other mediators may be powerless to compel
parents' participation, to enforce compliance with a mediated agreement,
or to notify a court when joint custody severely threatens the best
interests of the children. However, a guardian ad litem "may ... be in
a position to institute ... court proceedings on behalf of the child. '294
289. Note, supra note 14, at 1155.
290. Id. at 1158, 1162. (All of the interviewed guardians ad litem exhibited sensitivity
to children's problems).
291. Speca, supra note 229, at 333 (Children "need ways freely and safely to express
their thoughts and feelings...the court has a duty to require that children be provided a
representative with whom they can share their internal difficulties").
292. A problem which arises in mediation which may disturb the guardian ad litem
as much, if not more, than other mediators is "whether it is always better to protect
children from court battles even if it means allowing them to participate in a questionable
agreement." D. SAPOSNEK, supra note 32, at 267.
293. The guardian ad litem-mediator may provide the answer to the "true custodian"
problem in joint custody where litigation is involved, i.e., the problem of which joint
custodian institutes and settles legal actions for the children when parents have different
perspectives on such lawsuit, and both would presumably have authority to do either
without consulting the other. See Miller, supra note 2, at 393. The child advocate will
prevent parents' multiple representation of their children by either mediation between the
parents or actual legal representation of the children solely in his or her most traditional
role.
294. Davidson & Gerlach, supra note 37, at 294. See also Levin, supra note 40, at
350. The guardian ad litem may also be empowered to institute abuse, neglect, dependency,
or domestic violence actions on behalf of the child.
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Courts who are aware of joint custody's "forced remarriage" of hostile
parents may be less reluctant to permit the arrangement under the alert
supervision of a guardian ad litem as "a court 'watchdog' ... to see if
the parents have sold the children down the river. '295 Mediation's
confidentiality is justifiably sacrificed in the case of such extraordinary
circumstances to zealous loyalty to the child client's best interests.
Confidentiality will be maintained in all cases where it inures to those
interests. The guardian ad litem is the children's representative and
should not wait until a parent or his or her attorney files the necessary
court papers, if ever, when the joint custody arrangement and, subse-
quently, the mediation process adversely impacts upon the children.
Once in a court, the problem will probably not require separate
evaluation by a social or investigative agency which might extend
proceedings interminably while the children continue to suffer. The
guardian ad litem, as a factfinder, may report to the court his or her
findings, with or without opposition from the parents' attorneys. His or
her independent action against one or both parents may injure the
guardian's relationship of trust and confidence with the children,296 but
that is a small price for their expeditious protection. Criticism of
guardians ad litem as causing delays and burdensome expenses to parents
may be justifiably leveled at their appointment in divorce proceedings. 297
However, in this situation such criticism is misplaced. Familiarity with
the joint custody family and the dispute would allow the guardian ad
litem-mediator to immediately present the issue for decision before the
court. Factfinding for reports or the development of arguments to the
court has already been completed. Moreover, a timely contempt action
instituted or brought about by the guardian ad litem may stem the tide
of rising hostility between joint custodians bound for a costly and
The guardian ad litem-mediator imposed on the joint custody family should not create
a danger of more frequent court actions. As with the parents, the guardian ad litem must
abide by the statement of purpose or policy of joint custody embodied in the parents'
separation agreement, the court order, or the statute, i.e., it is in the best interests of
the children to have continuous quality contact with both parents. Moreover, the guardian
ad litem must continue to presume that both parents are equally fit for custody of their
children as determined by the court in the award of joint custody, despite his or her
personal opinions as to a particular parent's lifestyle, beliefs, or behavior. Only when there
is a definite and objective threat to the physical or emotional welfare of the children,
should the guardian ad litem-mediator be empowered to enter the courtroom on behalf
of the children.
295. Foster & Freed, supra note 17, at 27.
296. Donald Saposnek indicates that this is a problem of all ongoing evaluative
mediation. Children may feel betrayed by a mediator who, after assurances that he or
she would act in their best interests, takes a position in court which deprives them of a
full-time parent. Children may feel their confidences betrayed. Another danger is that
the guardian ad litem may take court action after children have informed him or her of
a threat which is nonexistent. See D. SAPOSNEK, supra note 32, at 15-16.
297. See Ardagh, supra note 229, at 578; Speca, supra note 229, at 337-38.
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protracted custody war.298 In any case, "the fact that additional time
and expense may result to the litigants to ensure protection of the rights
of their children is no reason for denying the protection." 299
Fear has been expressed that the introduction of guardians ad litem
into custody proceedings will intensify the adversarial character of
proceedings.3°° This might similarly be a danger in mediation. An
intrusive stranger30 with excessive influence over the court302 to represent
the children's interests, although those interests may be adverse to those
of their parents, would almost certainly and unnecessarily aggravate
tensions.30 3 However, the opposite result has been observed with the
presence of guardians ad litem in dispute resolution settings. Guardians
ad litem may actually pacify proceedings, either mediation or adjudi-
cation. Even if tensions are heightened by their intervention, however,
guardians ad litem can skillfully redirect these tensions toward obtaining
a mediated settlement between all the parties involved. That which
quells parental adversity in litigation may be equally successful in
mediation before the parents contemplate or need a return to court.
Guardians ad litem, by conscientiously attending to their wards' needs
and desires during the family conflict, must give similar attention to
the needs and desires of the wards' parents. The guardian ad litem does
"not operate in a vacuum" and must not neglect the primary role of
parents in deciding their children's futures. The guardian ad litem cannot
pretend to have a unique grasp of the elusive application of the best
interests standard.3°4 Instead, he or she must strive to arrange "custodial
arrangements as satisfying as possible for both parents; for in the last
analysis, it is the parents who will be primarily responsible for how well
298. This Article does not suggest that the mediator actually use this power in every
case to command parents' participation or agreement. Such practice would counteract not
only the self-determinative nature of mediation but the benefits from reduction of caseload
burdens for courts. The mediator may, however, include this power in his or her arsenal
to display before parents to persuade compliance.
299. Speca & Wehrman, supra note 10, at 31-32.
300. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 229, at 259; Ardagh,
supra note 229, at 601.
Attorney mediators may have difficulty altering their aggressive, adversarial problem-
solving attitudes to the non-adversarial passive approaches of mediation. See Riskin, supra
note 78, at 43-48; M. WHEELER, supra note 38, at 210.
301. Genden, supra note 249, at 592 ("[T]he intervention of a stranger with a briefcase
into what both parents and child recognize as an intensely personal conflict may be
tantamount to forcing an attorney upon an unwilling young client.").
302. Ardagh, supra note 229, at 601 ("[T]he judge might rely too much upon lawyer-
advocates for the child and thereby shirk their responsibility of making an objective
judgment on the custody issue.").
303. See Speca, supra note 229, at 338.
304. Casasanto, supra note 40, at 55; Mlyniec, supra note 231, at 13; Chambers,
supra note 253, at 513.
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the custodial arrangements work" 305 One windfall for the disrupted joint
custody family from the guardian's attempts to discern the most mutually
satisfying arrangements is facilitation of communication between all
concerned individuals. Fact finding by the guardian ad litem is the
medium through which parents learn of their opponents' attitudes and
concerns and, more importantly, of their childrens' attitudes and con-
cerns, perhaps overlooked in the heat of personal conflict. °6 Rather
than resenting the guardian's presence, parents tend to see the guardian
ad litem as a neutral person whom they can trust 0 7 and who honestly
cares for their children.30 8 The guardian's impartial intervention on the
children's behalf may moderate the atmosphere of conflict,0 9 allow for
exploration of alternative solutions310 and promote parental satisfaction
with the settlement or judicial decision, thus making future modifications
less likely.31' His or her appointment, in fact, may be implicitly for the
purpose of reducing rancor in the proceedings. 312 With an impartial
report and/or recommendation or argument made by the guardians ad
litem before a court, parental mud-slinging to prove superior custodial
"fitness" may become self-defeating. Tensions from such bitter combat
may be reduced, 313 for parents may be compelled "to present a more
realistic and less hostile position. '314
Parents have good reason to cooperate with guardians ad litem, to
seek to moderate their behavior toward one another and to improve
their relationships with their children during the tenures of guardians
305. Casasanto, supra note 40, at 55 (quoting Watson, The Children of Armageddon:
Problems of Custody Following Divorce, 21 SYRACUSE L. Rv. 55, 78 (1969-1970). See
also Note, supra note 14, at 1176 (instructions to be given to parents emphasizing their
importance).
306. The power of the guardian ad litem to promote communication has been noted
in Casasanto, supra note 40, at 46 ("[A]ppoint a guardian ad litem to present the child's
interests to the court and to the parents." (emphasis added)); Note, supra note 14, at
1173 n.226 ("None of the attorneys reported that he had been forbidden to talk to a
parent outside the presence of the parent's attorney."), at 1174 ("[D]iminish conflict by
facilitating reliable communication between the parties."), at 1185 ("[E]nhanced com-
munication between judge and child when an interview in chambers was requested.").
307. See Speca & Wehrman, supra note 10, at 39.
308. Speca, supra note 229, at 337.
309. Note, supra note 14, at 1174 n.236.
310. Levin, supra note 40, at 350 ("[T]he guardian could investigate and perhaps
find certain situations in which obvious relief could be afforded to mutually unaware
parents." (footnotes omitted)). Cf. supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
311. Casasanto, supra note 40, at 40.
312. Note, supra note 14, at 1136 ("Without a separate representative for the child,
the judge is not well-placed to reduce the rancor of the proceedings.").
313. See Speca, supra note 229, at 337.
314. Genden, supra note 249, at 592 (citing CALIFORNIA GovERNOR'S COMM'N ON
THE FAMILY REPORT 48 (1966)). See also Note, supra note 14, at 1136 n.47, 1185.
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ad litem. A report, argument, or recommendation by a guardian ad
litem to a court which casts one parent in a bad light may be devastating
for his or her future custodial status. 31 5 Not only his or her words, but
the guardian's very presence emphasizes "to the parents that the con-
trolling consideration is the welfare of the child, not their wishes and
desires." 31 6 In the litigation stage of parental controversy, the influence
of such personality may persuade parents and their attorneys to "drop
a tactic ... or even an entire claim ... contrary to the child's needs"
and to cooperate.317 Such influences 318 may also be directed towards
encouraging meaningful participation in mediation to produce a settle-
ment.31 9 When such mediation becomes prophylactic by its removal to
the prelitigation dispute, participation and compliance by parents will
certainly be increased.
Guardians ad litem may be the best mediators currently available
for joint custody disputes. The factfinding skills acquired executing their
duties in the courts are well suited for their educative roles as mediators.
The children's best interests in mediation will not be compromised and
cooperation and communication between parents will be encouraged by
the guardians. If, however, parents will not or cannot cooperate, the
children need not suffer while parental hostility builds until, finally, one
parent or his or her attorney takes action. The guardian ad litem may
step in to direct the children's needs to the court's attention. Joint
custody may or may not survive court intervention in the arrangement,
but at least with the guardian's involvement the decision will not be a
matter of tossing a coin. The dispute will become less accusatorial and
more inquisitorial and the best interests of the children just may be
served.
As mediators, guardians ad litem are perhaps the best option available
for the courts who are unhappily confronted by joint custody's increasing
315. Speca, supra note 229, at 337; L. KIEFER, supra note 72, at 174 ("[I]f the
attorney for your child recommends against you, you are completely ruined. Your chances
of winning when an attorney for the children says you should lose are remote."). But cf.
Note, supra note 14, at 1184. ("In practice, attorneys for the child perceived that they
could wield a powerful influence in court, but admitted that they did not control the
custody determination." (emphasis added)).
316. Ardagh, supra note 229, at 574; Note, supra note 14, at 1174.
317. Note, supra note 14, at 1174, 1176 ("[P]arents' attorneys backed down from
their positions and cooperated.").
318. Coercion is always a danger in evaluative mediation where "evaluation as a last
resort" may pressure parties into unsatisfactory agreements. See Hopkins, supra note 106,
at 68. The evaluative mediator, however, does not have the same degree of duty to
children as the guardian ad litem who should never compromise the future happiness of
the children for an immediate superficial solution.
319. Note, supra note 14, at 1173-75; Casasanto, supra note 40, at 40.
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popularity. Mandatory mediation prior to further litigation of joint
custody disputes by the guardian ad litem should keep many parents
and their attorneys on the path of cooperation and communication for
the benefit of the children. Where the court suspects the viability of
joint custody and yet feels coerced by state policy or parental agreement
into awarding joint custody, periodic monitoring of the arrangements
by the guardian ad litem as mediator may be advisable. Guardians ad
litem in a monitoring function can also provide courts and legislatures
with invaluable information regarding the effect of joint custody on post
divorce families. No longer need a "Catch-22" inhibit courts from
awarding joint custody.
D. Potential Problems with the Concept
No doubt the concept of the guardian ad litem as a mediator and
monitor will be challenged by many. The most certain objection will
originate with those who advocate minimal state intervention in the
family.320 These persons argue that state intervention mandating ap-
pointment of a guardian ad litem should occur only when the need for
separate representation is clearly shown.321 During custody litigation,
imposition of a guardian may be justified because parents have waived
"their claim to parental autonomy and thereby their right to be exclusive
representatives of their child's interests. ' 322 However, following the cus-
tody disposition, continuation of service by the guardian in such capacity
"without parental consent is to deny both parents and child due process.
It deprives parents of their right to represent their child through their
own counsel" 323 or mediator. However, in most states the court under
its parens patriae authority retains jurisdiction over the children of
divorce until their attainment of majority.3 24 The court has "virtually
unlimited power in its role as the protector of children." 312 The ap-
pointment of guardians ad litem-mediators to protect children's best
320. Minimal state intervention in the custody decision-making process is exemplified
by custody mediation at the time of divorce. See, e.g., Spencer & Zammit, supra note
24, at 912.
321. See Ardagh, supra note 229, at 587, 588, 606.
322. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNrr, supra note 227, at 115.
323. Id. at 113-14.
324. See Speca & Wehrman, supra note 10, at 9, 16; Long, supra note 226, at 620
n.43.
325. Speca & Wehrman, supra note 10, at 18.
Addressing the issue of the conceptual conflict between family autonomy and ongoing
court involvement in the family after a custody decree, the Honorable Henry T. Webber,
Judge of the Domestic Relations and Juvenile Divisions of the Court of Common Pleas,
Lorain County, Ohio, for sixteen years, has remarked: "Everything is a balancing and
the question is where your values take you. Wht is important: a viable relationship
between parents and children or that children be left in a combat zone?" Conversation
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interests in joint custody after a decree "would simply be another
manifestation" of a court's equity-like powers. 326 One state explicitly
permits continued service by guardians ad litem "after the final decree
has been granted. '327
Guardians ad litem-mediators may represent a happy medium between
strict state supervision of joint custody arrangements and parental au-
tonomy. As long as meaningful cooperation and communication exist
on child-rearing issues between joint custodians, and children are not
harmed by the arrangement, the mediator, who is coincidentally the
children's guardian ad litem, must always defer to parental prerogative.
However, when intense parental conflict destroys the vigor of joint
custody, the children are endangered, and mediation cannot restore this
vigor, the guardian ad litem, who happens to be the family's mediator,
may exercise his or her authority as legal representative of the children
to notify the court. Conferring such restraints and such authority upon
the guardian ad litem does not seem radical. "Whenever courts become
truly concerned with the possibility of inadequate protection for the
rights of children, they can justify separate representation by invoking
their inherent powers to do justice. The concept of the guardian ad
litem is firmly established in the judicial system and can readily be
expanded."3 28
From the perspective of legal ethics, guardians ad litem-mediators
have both advantages and disadvantages over other mediators.3 29 The
question of multiple representation which afflicts attorney mediators
does not exist when the guardian ad litem is a court employee 330 and/
or legal representative for the children. However, the child advocate-
with the Honorable Henry T. Webber, Judge of the Domestic Relations and Juvenile
Divisions of the Court of Common Pleas, Lorain County, Ohio (Dec. 30, 1987).
326. Id. at 27, 29. See also J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNrr, supra note 227,
at 124-25 (criticizing G. v. G., Conn. Super. Ct. No. 11 28 46 (Apr. 6, 1977) (unreported
opinion), a case which retained counsel for the child after the final decree.).
327. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 458:17(a) (Supp. 1985), cited in Casasanto, supra note
40, at 54.
328. Genden, supra note 249, at 586.
329. For a detailed analysis of ethical problems of lawyer mediators, see generally
Silberman, Professional Responsibility Problems of Divorce Mediation, 16 FAM. L.Q.
107 (1982); Crouch, supra note 249.
Note that attorneys' malpractice insurance may not cover the practice of mediation.
Coombs, supra note 69, at 492. As a court-appointed guardian ad litem, it may.
330. See Silberman, supra note 329, at 108 ("Mediation which is conducted or referred
under the auspices of the court or its auxiliary services does not seem subject to ethics
challenges." (footnotes omitted)); Crouch, supra note 250, at 223 ("[W]e should make a
careful distinction between court-run mediation or conciliation programs and private profit-
making ones. Obviously many of the objections to unconscionable profiteering and financial
exploitation of clients...would not apply to the public-sector scheme."). Professor Charles
Kettlewell, Ohio State University College of Law, concurs that court affiliation protects
many from charges of ethical violations. Conversations with Professor Charles Kettlewell,
Ohio State University College of Law (Feb. 1985).
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mediator, if called to fulfill his or her responsibilities in court, may
wrestle with the same dilemmas faced by other counsel for children
with respect to representing the children's best interests as he or she
unilaterally perceives them.3 31 This might occur where an emotionally
distraught child would rather endure his or her parents' bitter warfare
in a joint custody arrangement than risk losing one or the other parent
into the shadows of visitation.332 Another problem arises for the child
advocate by the likelihood that he or she will be called as a witness in
a subsequent proceeding. 3 3 It seems unlikely that parents would know-
ingly waive their rights to call a mediator who would play such an
influential role in litigation. Ethical problems which other guardians ad
litem face should also be considered, such as maintaining the confi-
dentiality of children's communications when not in their best interest
and receiving payment from parents to represent their children without
allowing parental influence upon their professional judgements.3 34
Opponents of the guardian ad litem-mediator structure for joint
custody dispute resolution could also point out defects in the current
practice of appointments of guardians ad litem which may carry over
to this new function. Throughout the literature are examples of how
indifferent, incompetent, or ineffectual representatives of the children
331. Genden, supra note 249, at 589. See also Long, supra note 226, at 612-16, 623;
Mlyniec, supra note 231, at 10; Note, supra note 14, at 1169.
332. Some suggested solutions to problems such as these include, "requesting the
court's permission to withdraw, requesting appointment as guardian ad litem rather than
as attorney, or making some sort of full or partial disclosure to the court that would
include a statement of the child's wishes." Note, supra note 14, at 1170 (proposed by
interviewed attorneys).
333. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101, DR 5-102 (1982).
This situation is analogous to that where an attorney has been functioning both as a
factfinder and as a child advocate prior to litigation and then upon litigation of the
custody case needs to testify. Professor Charles Kettlewell analyzes the problem as having
four separate solutions. (1) The court may deem the witness as the factfinder guardian
ad litem and not as representing the child as an attorney at that instance. (2) The attorney
may wait for a court order to testify or ask the court to sever the roles by appointing a
new child advocate. (3) The child may be permitted to consent as such testimony would
be in his or her best interests. And (4) the policies underlying DRs 5-101 & 5-102 may
be weighed to permit the child advocate to testify as the guardian ad litem. The problems
of cross-examination of a fellow member of the bar are not relevant in the absence of a
jury (as in most states). However, there may be a danger of prejudicing the interests of
the client if the "guardian" is impeached. Conversation with Professor Charles Kettlewell,
Ohio State University College of Law (Mar. 14, 1985).
334. One possible solution to the conflict of interest created by parental compensation
of the children's representative, see MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR
5-107(B), is for the "court appointed counsel [to] submit his expenses to the court" and
the court could then bill the parent(s). "This would insulate the child advocate from the
parents and address the ethical objection." Genden, supra note 249, at 591.
335. See L. KiEFi, supra note 72, at 174 (attorneys who share the judges' prejudices,
inexperienced attorneys who need the business, sons and daughters of judges' social
friends); Speca, supra note 229, at 338; Comment, supra note 226, at 255; Genden, supra
note 249, at 590.
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might be appointed.33 For example, a "guardian ad litem system could
risk exposure to politics and influence. ' 3 6 As long as mediators remain
unlicensed and unregulated, however, guardians ad litem who are licensed
as attorneys and regulated by the courts may be the only available
resource promising reasonably proficient services.
337
Another criticism which might be directed at the formula may relate
to the guardians' lack of knowledge, sensitivity, and training to effectively
mediate between the parents and protect the rights and interests of the
children.3 38 Skills acquired in negotiation, counseling, and mediation on
the courthouse steps may not be sufficiently developed for child custody
mediation. Proponents of implementation of the guardian ad litem mech-
anism in custody litigation have also expressed a concern for guardians'
lack of expertise in the multitude of disciplines from which the ideal
mediator might draw guidance to heal disruption in families.339 Some
writers have urged that a "new breed of lawyer" must emerge with
specialized skills in these diverse areas to assume the role of guardian
ad litem.340 However, guardians ad litem, like the mediator, need not
One writer suggests that in some jurisdictions for the guardians ad litem to do more
than play "out an expected role with little variance in the script from one case to
another...would virtually assure no future appointment and consequent loss of fees." Speca,
supra note 229, at 338 n.54 (quoting Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the
Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44 TEx. L. REv. 424, 448 (1966)).
The Honorable Henry T. Webber, Judge of the Domestic Relations and Juvenile
Divisions, Court of Common Pleas, Lorain County, Ohio, for over sixteen years, demands
much more from the guardians ad litem he appoints: "Generally, veteran practitioners
are chosen to act as guardians ad litem. It is not the place to start experimenting with
inexperienced attorneys." Judge Webber, however, has noted that not all courts may be
as fortunate as his has been in recruiting "better than average attorneys interested in
serving in these troubled situations." Seminar on "Guardian Ad Litem," Lorain County,
Ohio (Dec. 8, 1987) and conversation with Judge Webber (Dec. 30, 1987).
In my own experience observing guardians ad litem, I have noted some who will make
recommendations to the court after little more than brief conversations with the parties
involved on the day of the hearing and others who will go a distance out of their way,
including traveling to other cities, to complete thorough fact-finding.
336. Speca, supra note 229, at 338-39.
337. Mediators approved by the American Arbitration Association may be best suited
to undertake the guardian ad litem role.
338. See D. SAPOSNEK, supra note 32, at 38 ("lawyers who typically are assigned
the task of legal advocacy for the child usually have no special training for this task,
and therefore are not necessarily more knowledgeable about, or sensitive to, the needs
and feelings of children than are the judges or the parents' own attorneys."). But cf.
supra notes 290-301 and accompanying text.
339. See Genden, supra note 249, at 589; Speca, supra note 229, at 333, 337; Levin,
supra note 40, at 363.
340. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 40, at 363 ("trained in psychoanalytical child
development and specializing in child-custody cases").
Likewise, some commentators on mediation appear to demand skills and knowledge
by the mediator which would effectively preclude its practice except by an elite few. See,
e.g., D. SAPOSNEK, supra note 32, at 37.
The mediator must be competent to give valid, current, and helpful information
about child development, about children's typical and atypical responses to family
173
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be an expert in these disciplines. 341 For the guardian ad litem "to at
least be aware of the issues and understand the terminology of such
disciplines so that he or she can present innovative solutions" may be
sufficient.3 42 The mediation skills acquired by experienced guardians ad
litem in the midst of custody controversies give guardians ad litem
definite advantages over others for whom assuming the "go-between"
role may be a novel concept. Of course, additional training would always
be desirable.
As previously suggested, the costs for representation of children in
custody proceedings, 343 creates discomfort for some critics and the
conflicts, about family members' needs and feelings, about family dynamics, about
the divorce process (emotionally, structurally, and legally), and about the likely
future outcomes for the children and parents of a variety of different postdivorce
family structures. The mediator should be knowledgeable about individual psycho-
dynamics, interactional dynamics, family systems, and behavior change, and have
a broad general knowledge of psychological functioning. Child custody mediators
who are not specifically trained in these areas may seriously compromise the benefits
of child custody mediation.
Id. (footnote omitted).
This laundry list of requirements for the mediator seems to require employment of
mental health professionals in such capacity. However, mental health professionals who
mediate family disputes may lack sufficient knowledge of the "legal ramifications of
decisions made" by 'the parents to guide them properly to legally valid agreements.
Coombs, supra note 69, at 493. They may inadvertently "engage in the unauthorized
practice of law, exposing themselves to criminal sanctions." See Silberman, supra note
329, at 123. There is also a "danger that mediation might be swallowed up by other
therapy functions, when it should be visible to the public as a distinct alternative to the
courtroom." M. WHEELER, supra note 38, at 209. Finally, mediation by mental health
professionals may be distasteful to some parents who are "self-conscious" about submission
of their problems to therapy. Id.
341. "It is expected that the guardian will seek out and use expert opinions when
appropriate to facilitate" the purposes of mediation and child protection. Casasanto, supra
note 40, at 55. As with other mediators, the guardian ad liteqi should avoid transforming
mediation into therapy. The guardian ad litem may be empowered, however, to employ
mental health professionals to counsel the family prior to taking unsuccessful mediation
into court, a power the private mediator may not have. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD &
A. SOLNIT, supra note 227, at 56 (counsel for child employing mental health professionals).
See also supra note 192 and authorities cited therein; STANDARDS FOR FAMILY
MEDIATORS, supra note 112, at 455 ("the mediator shall distinguish [mediation] from
therapy or marriage counseling"), at 457 ("a mediator who is a mental health person,
shall not provide counseling or therapy to either party or both during or after the mediation
process"), at 458 (the mediator may be required "to recommend either or both [parents]
obtain expert consultation in the event that it appears that additional knowledge or
understanding is necessary for balanced negotiations"). See also Axelrod, Everett &
Haralambie, supra note 50, at 45 (mediation is not therapy). Out cf. Note, supra note
51, at 593 ("A mediator trained in the behavioral sciences can provide psychological
counseling to the parties as well as mediating a resolution").
342. Casasanto, supra note 40, at 55.
343. See supra notes 297-99 and accompanying text. See also Davidson & Gerlach,
supra note 37, at 251.
344. Joint custody is deemed by many commentators as a device suitable only for
the affluent, with its demands for two households for the children for joint physical
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guardian ad litem-mediator mechanism proposed may increase costs
dramatically. In custody litigation, parents who are already saddled with
expenses for their own attorneys, court costs, and possibly for psychiatric
examinations or social or investigative agency services may begrudge
outlays for another attorney for their children. In post-divorce situations,
especially cases of joint custody, one parent may be supporting two
households or one income may be supporting a household which formerly
had, and requires, two incomes. 44 If long-term, post-divorce employment
of guardians ad litem as mediators is mandated, many parents' incomes
may be overwhelmed. Mediation, itself, in the post-divorce context,
without limitations on its duration or direction, may be expensive.345
When attorneys are introduced as guardians ad litem-mediators, for
whom level of compensation may affect quality and availability, 346 parents
may see costs skyrocket. 347 Currently, the court may order one or both
parents to finance representation.3 48 If indigent parents are involved, a
governmental agency may cover these costs. 349 Other alternatives to
custody or constant travel for joint legal custody. See, e.g., Skoloff, supra note 29, at
54; M. WHEELER, supra note 38, at 81; Why Joint Custody Doesn't Always Work, supra
note 28, at 60 ("It's an upper-middle class phenomenon," quoting C. Ray Fowler, executive
director of Family Mediators). But cf. I. Ricci, supra note 43, at 112; Miller, supra
note 2, at 563. For a general discussion of the financial effects of joint custody on families,
see Patterson, supra note 43.
Disparities in earning power between the parents and the inevitable occasions of
extraordinary expenses can create anger and resentment threatening joint custody. See
Gardner, supra note 1, at 69. For a discussion and examples of how parents can cope
with these circumstances, see Parley, supra note 6, at 518; A Report of A Study, supra
note 7, at 408; M. WHEELER, supra note 38, at 801.
The mechanism proposed herein should also correct the inequalities of financial burdens
which may result from awards of joint custody, because the guardian ad litem may petition
the court for increase or decrease in the support award according to the equities of the
physical custody arrangement. Note that the recent reform of child support laws in the
United States has in some instances, at least temporarily, overlooked joint custody
arrangements. See OHIO CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES Part IVCA (Prepared by Supreme
Court Advisory Committee on Child Support Enforcement, Seventh Draft, Mar. 1986).
This omission is ironic because one of the most frequent criticisms of joint custody is
that it is sought by many men merely to reduce or eliminate child support obligations.
See, e.g., Schulman, supra note 6, at 3; Second Thoughts on Joint Child Custody, supra
note 40, at 4.
345. The reader should note that any post-divorce mediation program may be impossible
for some families because of prohibitive costs. Parents may pay not only for the mediator's
services, but for retention of their own attorneys during the process to approve agreements.
346. Genden, supra note 249, at 591.
347. See Dullea, supra note 71, at 15 ("In general, the charge for mediation is said
to range from $50 to $100 an hour...lawyers' fees range from $125 to $300 an hour.").
348. See Davidson & Gerlach, supra note 37, at 251 ("Fourteen states have laws
which provide for the court to enter an order against one or both parents, requiring them
to pay the costs, fees, and disbursements of the guardian ad litem or counsel for the
child." (footnotes omitted)); Levin, supra note 40, at 364 (citing UNIFORM MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE AcT).
349. See Davidson & Gerlach, supra note 37, at 251; Levin, supra note 40, at 364;
Genden, supra note 249, at 591; Casasanto, supra note 40, at 40. 56-57.
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reduce costs for indigent families or for financially strapped families
include enlistment of pro bono services to provide guardian ad litem-
mediators 350 or full or partial governmental subsidization of a program.
Benefits inuring to the children of divorce from the institution of such
a system may easily justify public funding to secure skilled personnel.
The most severe criticism of the guardian ad litem-mediator mech-
anism may originate with advocates of joint custody.31 Parental auton-
omy and family privacy will be decimated by the intrusion of such a
powerful figure into the joint custody arrangement. Parents may feel
restricted in their actions and fear that unconventional behavior or
lifestyles will clash with individual values of the guardian ad litem. A
conservative, unsympathetic, or narrow-minded guardian ad litem may
discriminate against them or even deem trivialities as sufficient grounds
for recommending to a similarly disposed court that they lose custody.
One of the original purposes behind joint custody was to circumscribe,
if not eliminate, the "third parent," the court, from the post-divorce
family. The guardian ad litem may pose a greater threat than the court.
He or she may exceed his or her authority and attempt to become the
sole post-divorce decision-making parent. Parents may fear attacking a
"friend of the court" to regain authority or to effectuate the guardian's
removal. Among less domineering guardians ad litem, skepticism re-
garding the underlying values or application of joint custody may cause
The presence of this service for indigent parents may allow wider application of the
joint custody system, regarded by some as only available to the affluent. See supra notes
43, 344 and authorities cited therein.
Whether joint custody is even possible among low income individuals is analyzed at
Johnson, Joint Custody Arrangements and AFDC Eligibility, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
3 (May 1984).
350. See Levin, supra note 40, at 364 (pro bono services proposed).
For parents who cannot afford the services of a guardian ad litem-mediator after
divorce, the establishment of programs may be the only manner by which parents and
courts may reap the benefits of the mechanism proposed in this Article. Funding of such
programs, however, is perhaps the most critical problem for the practical viability of the
mechanism, even if such programs are established. Judge Henry T. Webber of the Domestic
Relations and Juvenile Divisions of the Court of Common Pleas of Lorain County, Ohio,
has commented on the interrelationship between funding and the quality of mediation
and conciliation programs for custody and visitation disputes. He has observed that often
funding for innovative programs is "most erratic." Without consistent and adequate funding,
such programs will attract only "people who can do nothing else" rather than "people
who do it out of dedication." Dedication, however, is not enough, because the "suitable"
practitioners must have a "native ability" to mediate such family conflicts, for "this is
not amateur night." Even if "careful in selection of a mediator" among this group of
qualified and dedicated individuals, Judge Webber has noted a "very high bum-out rate"
among them. He has therefore expressed grave doubts as to the efficacy of a system
which would rely on pro bono referrals, legal aid attorneys, or government subsidization.
Conversation with the Honorable Henry T. Webber, Judge of the Domestic Relations and
Juvenile Divisions of the Court of Common Pleas, Lorain County, Ohio (Dec. 30, 1987).
351. But cf. Foster & Freed, supra note 17, at 27 ("The injection of the child counsel
or watchdog into the picture [at the time of divorce] probably would result in more court
decrees awarding joint custody.").
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guardians ad litem-mediators to attempt to abolish the system. Guardians'
doubts as to parents' ability to put aside their differences and cooperate
after divorce and guardians' doubts as to the benefits of shuttling children
between homes to effect parental interaction, may cause some guardians
to overreact to disturbances in parental relationships or in children's
behavior which may simply reflect natural adjustment to the divorce.352
Moreover, a guardian ad litem-mediator may see a joint custody
dispute as a vehicle to perpetuate his or her own employment. Without
a pending legal action to circumscribe the duration of the process as
in divorce mediation, post-divorce mediation may continue indefinitely.
For the guardian, parental cooperation and communication on child-
rearing issues without assistance may signal termination of employment.
Unlike private mediators who may rush agreement between parents to
chalk up another success, the guardian ad litem may unnecessarily
prolong the process to avoid final agreement. Protracted mediation
promises larger fees and perhaps a reawakening of hostilities between
parents. Parents may come to distrust mediation and seek court inter-
vention. Deliberate procrastination in dispute resolution by the guardian
may undermine not only parental trust but parental expectations that
joint custody is a viable system for their post-divorce family. Too much
depends upon the individual personality of the guardian.
Specific guidelines to delineate rights, powers, and scope of authority
of guardians ad litem, parents, and children within the proposed system
of joint custody mediation should eliminate most of the potential prob-
lems. Such guidelines may be incorporated into the joint custody final
decree or may be used by courts to set a general framework for reference.
Of course, each family will require a set of rules framed according to
its particular needs and circumstances. The following sample guidelines
might be used by courts and families in the development of their
individualized programs for joint custody mediation.
352. The guardian ad litem's presence rather than increasing cooperation and com-
munication within the family, see supra notes 304-14 and accompanying text, may
potentially create a chasm between the parents and the children as the guardian ad litem
may become the instrument through which children can execute manipulation and other
strategies on their parents. Ardagh, supra note 229, at 582-83.
JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
GUIDELINES
A. Duration of service of the Guardian ad litem-mediator.353
(1) Termination after one year's mediation service upon agreement
by both parents and their attorneys, if any, and the guardian
ad litem, subject to immediate reinstatement by written request
of either parent for any good faith reason at any time until
[termination date or contingency]
(2) Termination after two year's mediation service by agreement
between both parents, and their attorneys, if any, subject to
immediate reinstatement by request of either parent, if either
parent reasonably believes the health or safety of the child(ren)
is threatened;
(3) Termination after child(ren) reach(es) age of sufficient maturity
to mediate between parents, by agreement of both parents, their
attorneys, if any, and the guardian ad litem, subject to immediate
reinstatement by request of the child(ren) for any reason which
the guardian ad litem reasonably believes affects the child(ren)'s
best interests; or
(4) Termination and replacement by court order at any time upon
request by either parent or any child for good cause shown by
353. The duration of the service of guardian ad litem-mediator would vary according
to need perceived for such service by the parties or by the court. An anticipated termination
date, definite or based upon some contingency, however, should be set at the initiation
of the program to avoid later misunderstandings between the guardian ad litem, the court,
and the parties. There is certainly the potential for malpractice to be alleged against the
guardian ad litem who believes his or her tenure has expired, contrary to the expectations
of the court or the parties, especially in a crisis situation.
The basis for the figures employed herein is the estimate given by some commentators
as to the period of time required for parents to surface from the disorganization and
disequalibrium of divorce and to fully adjust to their new roles and responsibilities. See
Scheiner, Musetto & Cordier, supra note 19, at 1000 (one year); J. FOLBERG & A.
TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 161 (two years). But cf. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra
note 21, at 190 (five years after the divorce the study of sole custody families revealed
that "31% of the men and 41% of the women had not yet achieved psychological or
social stability").
[Vol. 3:1 1987]
GUARDIAN AD LITEM
[standard of proof] evidence of guardian ad litem-mediator:
(a) incompetence or bias,
(b) excessive influence,
(c) extreme interference with the joint custody family not rea-
sonably related to protection of any child's best interests,
(d) or any other reasonable ground, (e.g. gross incompatability
with children).
Reasonable notice shall be provided to the guardian ad litem-
mediator and all interested individuals, unless exceptional cir-
cumstances demand an ex parte hearing for this limited purpose.
[This proceeding should be summary in character and preferably
in camera.]
(5) Notwithstanding any other provision of these guidelines, termi-
nation by voluntary withdrawal of the mediator at any time after
one year, by entry filed with the court if the mediator reasonably
believes the joint custodians have established and will perpetuate
a relationship of cooperation and communication for the benefit
of the children, subject to immediate reinstatement by written
request of either parent which shall be filed with the court, if
the guardian ad litem reasonably believes the health or safety
of the child(ren) is threatened.
B. Authority of the Guardian ad litem-mediator 54
354. The mediating and monitoring role of the guardian ad litem in the post-divorce
family does not confer added authority upon the guardian ad litem. Rather, when exercising
his or her mediator function, the guardian ad litem should feel much more constrained
in authority than when officially acting as a friend of the court or attorney for the children
in the courtroom setting. Just as the function of the guardian ad litem in judicial proceedings
strictly corresponds to the scope, direction, and duration of the judicial inquiry, the function
of the guardian ad litem in mediation practice should be generally circumscribed to
implementing measures to effect familial self-determination of the best interests of the
children. Never should the guardian ad litem permit any one, including him or herself,
to perceive his or her authority as that of a guardian of the person or estate of the
children of a joint custody family.
JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
(1) Unless the guardian ad litem-mediator reasonably believes that
the best interest of the child(ren) require otherwise and duly
exercises his or her authority under subsection (2) of this section,
the guardian ad litem shall at all times:
(a) function exclusively as a mediator for all disputes which the
parents present for mediation for the duration of his or her
service;
(b) promote the policy of this joint custody decree [that the
children's best interests are optimally served by maximum
contact with both parents and that both parents shall equally
share decision-making responsibility for all major decisions
which may affect the children];
(c) respect and protect the privacy of the family during and
after his or her service for the family;
(d) strictly adhere to the Standards of Practice for Lawyer
Mediators in Family Disputes (1984) of the American Bar
Association;
(e) upon reasonable written notice, be available to the child(ren)
and the family for mediation related services, except written
notice shall not be required when the child(ren)'s health or
safety is in imminent peril; and
(f) presume that each parent is fit for custody of the child(ren)
as determined by the court.
(2) When in the course of providing mediation related services for
the joint custody family the guardian ad litem-mediator reason-
ably believes that the best interests of the children are severely
threatened by
(i) parental neglect,
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(ii) excessive inter-parental hostility,
(iii) parental abuse, or
(iv) the mechanics of the joint custody arrangement in general
(shuttling, etc.)
the guardian ad litem immediately shall
(a) attempt to mediate an agreement between the parents to eliminate
the severe threat;
(b) if subsection (a) is not effective, temporarily terminate mediation
and refer parents to outside experts in helping professions;
(c) if subsection (a) or (b) is not effective, or if the threat to the
children's best interests manifestly demands imperative action,
[according to his or her authority as a guardian ad litem,]
(1) notify the court of the threat, or
(2) institute an action on behalf of the child(ren) to remove the
threat; and
(3) if either (1) or (2) is invoked, show by [standard of proof]
evidence that such action is imperative;
(d) attempt to resume mediation between the parents in the course
of litigation and to obtain a settlement in the best interests of
the chil(ren).
C. Responsibilities of the Joint Custodians
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(1) Joint custodians shall, at all times in the course of mediation,
exert their best effort to comply with the policy clause of this
decree;
(2) Joint custodians shall in good faith participate in mediation and
comply with the agreements signed in mediation, unless either
joint custodian reasonably believes that circumstances have rad-
ically changed and the best interests of the child(ren) are not
served by the agreement, at which time said parent shall im-
mediately enter mediation to effect a change in the agreement
to serve the best interests of the child(ren).
(3) Joint custodians shall notify the guardian ad litem-mediator of
all major disputes which may affect the children at least thirty
days prior to initiation of any action in court, except as provided
in section A(4) of these Guidelines, and submit any such dispute
to mediation;
(4) Joint custodians shall furnish to the guardian ad litem-mediator
upon reasonable notice
(a) private access to the child(ren) prior to or during mediation
sessions at the child(ren)'s current residence or at the site
of the mediation, unless both parents believe such access is
unreasonable, and agree to a reasonable location and/or means
of access [such as with a neutral relative];
(b) access to any and all records pertaining to the child(ren);
and
(c) access to any other nonprivileged information not pertaining
to the children which may reasonably facilitate the mediation
process.
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D. Schedule of Mediation and Monitoring Sessions
55
(1) For the first year following the date of this decree, mediation
sessions shall be at four month intervals and as provided in
subsection (3) of this section.
(2) Except as provided in Section A(5) of these Guidelines, for the
second year following the date of this decree, mediation sessions
shall be held periodically at six month intervals and as provided
in subsection (3) of this section.
(3) Except as provided in Section A(5) of these Guidelines, mediation
sessions may be held at any time upon request of either parent
or any child upon reasonable written notice of the request and
an explanation of the need for mediation, except reasonable
notice shall not be required when the child(ren)'s health or safety
is in imminent danger.
(4) Notwithstanding the preceding subsections of this section, if
either joint custodian returns to court to dispute the original or
amended joint custody decree or the guardian ad litem justifiably
takes action to enforce compliance with the original or amended
joint custody decree, the guardian ad litem with leave of court
may adjust the schedule to reinstate the process as in subsection
(1), unless both parents agree otherwise.
355. The schedule for mediation sessions proposed herein is obviously somewhat
arbitrary and must be adjusted to the circumstances of the family and the award. For
example, in those courts where the joint custody decree is provisional for a short period
of time, see supra note 220, the court may order mediation by the guardian ad litem at
monthly intervals until the decree is final and thereafter at specified six month intervals.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Gradually, courts are awakening to the fact that children require a
positive, continuous relationship with each parent following a divorce.
However, the current practices of custody adjudication and disposition
tend to subvert the development of this type of relationship rather than
advance it. Awarding joint custody to a broken family may be one of
the few alternatives available to expeditiously mitigate the disruption
of divorce and insure continuous, quality parenting of children following
divorce.
Courts, however, may justifiably question the wisdom of joint custody
for many families. Yet, they may not have the time nor the inclination
to challenge parental agreements for joint custody or state policies
favoring the arrangement. The appointment of a guardian ad litem for
the children in joint custody families to temporarily perform mediation
for the family and monitoring services for the court as joint custody
continues may be the best available solution. Courts need not relinquish
their responsibility to supervise the interests of the children after divorce
to the unkrio;n mechanics of this still relatively new custody system.
Parents will retain autonomy from governmental intrusion into family
decision-making so long as they continue to cooperate and communicate
on issues affecting their children. Children will derive benefits from
contact with two parents, much as if the family had survived intact.
When courts encounter suspicious joint custody separation agreements
or when they cannot ascertain the maturity of the parents to cooperate
after divorce, but, in either instance feel compelled to order joint custody
or reluctant to deny it, the guardian ad litem-mediator should be enlisted
to serve the family and the court.356 Such a mechanism may discomfort
356. Some circumstances wherein the guardian ad litem-mediator mechanism may
best be employed:
(1) generally where questionable agreements to joint custody are submitted to the
court for approval;
(2) where one or both parents object to joint custody, but where statutory policies
mandate its award;
(3) where parents have agreed to joint custody, but are exceptionally hostile and
contentious with respect to other terms of the divorce;
(4) where neither parent is willing to shoulder the burden of full responsibility as a
sole custodial parent. See Comment, supra note 20, at 1117, or neither parent is regarded
as fit in such capacity, but the court is inclined toward an award of joint custody for
lack of a better alternative. See Stamper v. Stamper, 3 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2541 (Mich.
Cir. Ct., Wayne Co. 1977); M. WHEELER, supra note 38, at 86 (discussion of other
cases);
(5) where courts are caught in a "Catch 22" as to the viability of the concept of
joint custody. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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some proponents of each of the three custody reforms - joint custody,
custody mediation, and guardians ad litem - but they can hardly object
to measures aimed at making each of them work. 5 7 They can hardly
object to further measures to protect the best interests of the children.
357. A Bill of Rights, supra note 236, at 356.
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